You seem confused there. Muller IS NOT the prosecutor, he is the investigator

The house of representatives is the prosecutor.

Congress is the jury and the speaker is the foreman.

The House of Representatives are the legal body Muller will turn his findings over to and will decide by a 3/4 majority v**e to present impeachment chargers to Congress who will decide but a 3/4 majority v**e if the President shall be removed from office.

Sorry if that burst your bubble or hopes but that is the law.

God bless! America

(Continued)

A similar tension exists at the other end of the chain of command. Individual federal agents and prosecutors have political views, of course, and they remain free as citizens to express them on matters of public concern not pursuant to their official duties. It would be improper to discriminate against a federal career employee because of her political views. For example, it’s no secret that FBI Director Louis Freeh disliked President Bill Clinton and thought he had a damaged “moral compass,” or that some FBI agents harbored a “deep antipathy” to Hillary Clinton—but that alone would not disable them from doing their jobs.

However, law enforcement officials are expected to ignore politics and their personal views on other matters when executing their official duties. They are bound to enforce the law regardless of whether the suspect or defendant is a Democrat or a Republican. And in part to ensure the appearance of apolitical justice and enhance public confidence, they are limited by federal law and policy in what they can say and do while on duty or using government facilities. If they can’t abide by those limits, they can be reassigned or face other discipline. That is what happened to Pete Strzok, the FBI agent who was removed from Mueller’s team based on his text exchanges with another Bureau employee.

That’s the structure of rules and standards governing information-sharing between Congress and the executive and within the executive branch.Now let’s consider the unusual posture in which that framework is currently being applied.
As the Post and Times articles noted, Trump on May 2 tweeted as follows:
“A R****d System - They don’t want to turn over Documents to Congress. What are they afraid of? Why so much redacting? Why such unequal “justice?” At some point I will have no choice but to use the powers granted to the Presidency and get involved!”

Prior tweets in the same vein include the following:

“What does the Department of Justice and FBI have to hide? Why aren’t they giving the strongly requested documents (unredacted) to the HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE? Stalling, but for what reason? Not looking good!”

“So sad that the Department of “Justice” and the FBI are slow walking, or even not giving, the unredacted documents requested by Congress. An embarrassment to our country!”

“The top Leadership and Investigators of the FBI and the Justice Department have politicized the sacred investigative process in favor of Democrats and against Republicans - something which would have been unthinkable just a short time ago. Rank & File are great people!”

In addition, on Nov. 2, 2017, the President told a radio talk-show host that “he was ‘very unhappy’ with the Justice Department and lamented the political norms that maintain a separation between the president and federal law enforcement. ‘The saddest thing is, because I am the president of the United States, I am not supposed to be involved with the Justice Department,’ Trump [said]. ‘I’m not supposed to be involved with the FBI. I’m not supposed to be doing the kind of things I would love to be doing and I am very frustrated by it. It’s very discouraging to me. I’ll be honest, I’m very unhappy with it, that the Justice Department isn’t going … maybe they are, but you know, as president — and I think you understand this — as a president you’re not supposed to be involved in that process.’”

These p**********l statements are strange in many ways. First, they recognize a norm against p**********l interference not only with respect to investigations, but implicitly with respect to the current document disputes—at least insofar as the president hasn’t yet stepped in at the Justice Department with respect to something he obviously cares about deeply. But the May 2 tweet also contains an explicit threat at any time to breach that norm and “use the powers granted to the Presidency and get involved!” This is similar to other market-testing previously conducted by p**********l tweet or statement. Perhaps another cycle of panicked reaction—i.e., publicly-expressed opposition—will deter him.
Second, the tweets don’t make clear the norm that is in question. As discussed above, there is a strong general norm against p**********l influence over Justice Department investigations. But the same is not necessarily true with respect to p**********l influence over the Justice Department providing information to Congress about investigations. In that latter area, in fact, the opposite seems closer to the t***h, which may have profound consequences.

The norms permitting p**********l involvement apply slightly differently with respect to classified information and information subject to executive privilege. With respect to classified information, there is a tradition of p**********l consultation with departments and agencies before declassifying, but no one doubts the president’s prerogative if he or she decides to get involved. The Supreme Court describes p**********l authority here in very personal terms, relying on the Commander-in-Chief Clause of the Constitution. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988). It would not be at all unprecedented or untoward for the president or other White House officials to participate and exert some influence in a declassification process. The same is probably true with respect to an agency’s refusal to provide classified information to properly cleared members of Congress acting within their oversight jurisdiction: the White House would properly want to be informed and weigh in before an agency did something that might trigger a constitutional showdown.

The same is true with respect to executive privilege, perhaps to an even greater degree. The Supreme Court has discussed executive privilege in personal terms regarding the president (although that is understandable, because the Nixon case literally involved P**********l communications). More importantly, President Ronald Reagan’s official policy was that only the president could assert executive privilege, and most other modern presidents seem to have followed that approach as a formal or informal matter. (For a very interesting historical review of modern executive privilege, see Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon’s Shadow, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1069 (1999).)

In the Operation Fast and Furious controversy, Attorney General Eric Holder did not assert executive privilege, but instead wrote a letter to Obama requesting that Obama assert the privilege—which he did. (To be sure, the congressional subpoena in Fast and Furious was for documents created “in the course of [the Justice Department’s] deliberative process concerning how to respond to congressional and related media inquiries into that operation,” rather than for documents pertaining to the operation or investigation itself, but that was not dispositive. Holder almost surely would not have asserted executive privilege without p**********l approval even for documents pertaining to an ongoing investigation of particular individuals.)

The norm restricting p**********l action with respect to congressional demands for Justice Department documents today does not concern influence over investigations, but instead conflicts of interest. Trump should not influence the Justice Department’s decision on whether to provide documents to Congress—not because the documents pertain to an investigation, but because they pertain to an investigation of Trump (and/or his close associates). That may be especially true in light of some of the prior shenanigans involving the White House and the House (specifically, House Intelligence Committee Chairman Devin Nunes) with respect to the Carter Page FISA warrant and related matters. As noted above, the Times reports that senior officials at the Justice Department and the FBI believe that members of the House are acting as a kind of cat’s paw for the president.

The difficulty, however, is that while norms may counsel or compel p**********l inaction, with respect to the assertion of executive privilege there may be a need for p**********l action. Is there a norm affirmatively requiring the president to follow the advice of his acting attorney general and assert executive privilege against his personal preference when he suffers from a conflict? That seems unlikely—the best one could hope for is probably p**********l silence (or perhaps if there were a formal recusal, the vice president’s decision on the matter). Could the acting attorney general successfully assert executive privilege against a congressional subpoena in the face of p**********l silence? What would happen (in court or otherwise) in such a case? What would happen if the president, despite any applicable norms, filed a brief or statement (or tweet) expressly disclaiming executive privilege with respect to the documents in question?

These and other questions may provide many hours of amusement for OLC and the legal academy. But here and now they show why Rod Rosenstein is in a very tough position, and why he may feel compelled to lean in favor of disclosure to Congress, even if he will not provide every document the House has demanded. Historically, an appeal to House leadership might have helped, because leadership has historically been somewhat more respectful of tradition, but Rosenstein has apparently already tried that and failed. To properly resist a full-powered congressional onslaught, a federal agency needs active support from the White House, not grudging inaction with periodic threats to pull the rug. One of the features of a system of separated powers is that the president can accomplish a great deal with the support of Congress, or even an energetic minority of Congress (and the passivity of the remainder). Where the president is disabled by a conflict of interest and uses members of Congress to fight a proxy war against his own subordinates, however, the feature might be seen by some as a bug.
The more that Rosenstein accedes to congressional demands for investigative information, the more he erodes the norms expressed in the Linder Letter. This will have consequences in the long run unless it is reversed. If the Trump era is seen in hindsight as a brief but severe fever, perhaps its precedents will have little impact in the ongoing struggle between the political branches. But in the near term, every disclosure of classified information will also resonate through the Freedom of Information Act. In court, the Justice Department has tried at times to reduce the impact of particularly fevered p**********l tweets, but generally without much luck. So it will be interesting to see how today’s disclosures to Congress are dealt with in the future.

By David Kris, LAWFARE
MAY 5, 2018

Under DOJ regulations, a deputy AG assumes the authority of the AG ONLY on those issues from which the AG has recused himself, and in this case, is a very narrow and limited area. Rosenstein went rogue almost from the get go, he assumed full authority of the AG to act in any manner and on any issue he sees fit. Rosenstein has been and still is acting beyond his legal authority. I am still baffled why the AG has not reined in this out-of-control political hack.

28 U.S. Code § 595:

(1)Congressional oversight.—
The appropriate committees of the Congress shall have oversight jurisdiction with respect to the official conduct of any independent counsel appointed under this chapter, and such independent counsel shall have the duty to cooperate with the exercise of such oversight jurisdiction.

You are right. In the 1970s Rule X of the Standing Rules was created allowing information to be released, even if classified. Clause 11 of Rule X covers HPSCI, with paragraph (g) delineating the process the committee can use to disclose classified information if “the public interest would be served by such disclosure.” Ergo, Congress can demand from any Department such information they deem necessary in the interest of the general public.
Certainly, to release such information to the nation requires approval by the sitting president. Also see, 50 U.S.C. § 3091, “[t]he President shall ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States.” See also 50 U.S.C. § 3092. The “fully and currently informed” standard applies specifically to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), where it is part of semi-annual or other periodic reporting requirements in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1808, 1826, 1846, 1862, 1881f, and 1885c.

Remember the Linder Letter of 2000? This letter is what the Mueller team is using to withhold information to Congress. Linder argues that there is information that may be withheld such as: "materials that are protected by law (such as grand jury information pursuant to Rule 6(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and taxpayer information pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6103); information the disclosure of which might compromise open criminal investigations or prosecutions or civil cases or constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and predecisional deliberative communications (such as internal advice and preliminary positions and recommendations)." But, the Lender Letter is not law. The Justice Department and the FBI are part of the executive branch, of which the president is the chief, and their leaders are the president’s subordinates, exercising aspects of the “executive Power” that is vested in him by the Constitution. The Constitutional powers can not be set aside.

You are right. In the 1970s Rule X of the Standing Rules was created allowing information to be released, even if classified. Clause 11 of Rule X covers HPSCI, with paragraph (g) delineating the process the committee can use to disclose classified information if “the public interest would be served by such disclosure.” Ergo, Congress can demand from any Department such information they deem necessary in the interest of the general public.
Certainly, to release such information to the nation requires approval by the sitting president. Also see, 50 U.S.C. § 3091, “[t]he President shall ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States.” See also 50 U.S.C. § 3092. The “fully and currently informed” standard applies specifically to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), where it is part of semi-annual or other periodic reporting requirements in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1808, 1826, 1846, 1862, 1881f, and 1885c.

Remember the Linder Letter of 2000? This letter is what the Mueller team is using to withhold information to Congress. Linder argues that there is information that may be withheld such as: "materials that are protected by law (such as grand jury information pursuant to Rule 6(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and taxpayer information pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6103); information the disclosure of which might compromise open criminal investigations or prosecutions or civil cases or constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and predecisional deliberative communications (such as internal advice and preliminary positions and recommendations)." But, the Lender Letter is not law. The Justice Department and the FBI are part of the executive branch, of which the president is the chief, and their leaders are the president’s subordinates, exercising aspects of the “executive Power” that is vested in him by the Constitution. The Constitutional powers can not be set aside.

Congress is NOT under investigation and has OVERSIGHT over all federally funded agencies, which is all of them. Congress is our duly elected reps to protect and discharge the people's will not any agencies will, not delegated to them under the Constitution or by Congress. We the people ordained and established our Government, three branches, Executive (President), Legislative (Congress/write the laws), Judicial (Supreme Court) that the Constitution be upheld and protected as the SUPREME LAW of the LAND!