Ignorant dips**t, the E*******l College IS a core principle of the constitution, as is the RIGHT to v**e.
The POTUS is the only federal officer elected by all American v**ers.
What may be called the "popular v**e" is limited to the residents of the several states in electing those to represent them in the HOR.
The ratification of the 17th amendment destroyed the authority of the US Senate to represent their state legislatures.
The E*******l College prevents one region from dominating the governance of our Republic
By David J. Bowie, Dec. 18, 2019.
Article II Section 1 of the constitution established the E*******l College for the e******n of the president and vice president. However, there are those who believe that this institution is outdated and should be abolished.
During my career in State Government, I learned one very important lesson: The numbers don’t lie. So let’s take a look at the numbers.
As of 2018, the population of the United States is 327 million people, and the combined population of the top six States, as e*******l v**es are concerned is 135,486,171 and the total number of E*******l v**es totals 191.
While not minimizing the importance of the 191 E*******l v**es, consider, for a moment, the future of our republic if 135 million people decide the fate of approximately 200 million people. From my perspective, this is a scenario that is just too frightening to contemplate.
The Founding Fathers, were men of extraordinary wisdom and insight, and it was their belief that the “playing field” should be level and that a particular geographic area of the country would not have undue influence on the outcome of an e******n, simply because of their population. This was the rationale behind the formation of the E*******l College.
Imagine, if you will, the republic that the Founding Fathers fought and sacrificed for reduced to a majority-driven democracy. Do we dare contemplate the possibility of social policies being decided on the whim of misinformed or uninformed e*****rate? I can’t, and the possibility frightens me in ways I can’t and don’t want to imagine.
Our constitution was written by remarkable men, of extraordinary and amazing wisdom and intelligence, and it does not need to evolve, change or conform to the whims of radical factions in our society.
Although it cannot be confirmed, Thomas Jefferson was believed to have said that democracy was equal to mob rule. The very concept threatens the fabric of our country.
The American people must not be duped by shortsighted and diluted people who would seek to undermine the ideals and principles that are at the very heart of our great nation.
Why the “National Popular V**e” scheme is unconstitutional
The U.S. Supreme Court says each state legislature has “plenary” (complete) power to decide how its state’s p**********l e*****rs are chosen.
But suppose a state legislature decided to raise cash by selling its e*****rs to the highest bidder. Do you think the Supreme Court would uphold such a measure?
If your answer is “no,” then you intuitively grasp a basic principle of constitutional law—one overlooked by those proposing the “National Popular V**e Compact” (NPV).
NPV is a plan to change how we elect our president. Under the plan, each state signs a compact to award all its e*******l v**es to the p**********l candidate who wins the national popular v**e. The compact comes into effect when states with a majority of p**********l e*****rs sign on.
In assessing the constitutionality of NPV, you have to consider some of its central features. First, NPV abandons the idea that p**********l e*****rs represent the people of their own states. Second, it discards an e******n system balanced among interests and values in favor of one recognizing only national popularity. That popularity need not be high: A state joining the NPV compact agrees to assign its e*****rs to even the winner of a tiny plurality in a multi-candidate e******n.
Third, because NPV states would have a majority of v**es in the E*******l College, NPV would effectively repeal the Constitution’s provision for run-off e******ns in the House of Representatives.
Fourth, NPV requires each state’s e******n officer to apply the v**e tabulations certified by other state e******n officers—even if those tabulations are known to be fraudulent or erroneous. Indeed, NPV would give state politicians powerful incentives to inflate, by fair means or foul, their v**e totals relative to other states.
Don’t changes that sweeping require a constitutional amendment?
In answer to this question, NPV advocates point out that the Constitution seemingly gives state legislatures unlimited authority to decide how their e*****rs are appointed. They further note that the Constitution recognizes the reserved power of states to make compacts with each other. Although the Constitution’s text requires that interstate compacts be approved by Congress, NPV advocates claim congressional approval of NPV is not necessary. They observe that in U.S. Steel v. Multistate Tax Comm’n (1978) the Supreme Court held that Congress must approve a compact only when the compact increases state power at the expense of federal power.
NPV advocates may be wrong about congressional approval. It is unclear that the justices would follow U.S. Steel’s ruling now. The Constitution’s language requiring congressional approval is crystal clear, and the court today is much more respectful of the Constitution’s text and historical meaning than it was in 1978. Moreover, you can make a good argument that U.S. Steel requires congressional approval for NPV because NPV would weaken federal institutions: It would (1) abolish the role of the U.S. House of Representatives in the e*******l process and (2) alter the p**********l e******n system without congressional involvement. Furthermore, even the U.S. Steel case suggested that compacts require congressional approval whenever they “impact . . . our federal structure.”
A more fundamental problem with NPV, however, is that with or without congressional approval it violates a central principle of constitutional law.
The Constitution recognizes two kinds of powers: (1) those reserved by the Tenth Amendment in the states by reason of state sovereignty (“reserved powers”) and (2) those created and granted by the Constitution itself (“delegated powers”). Reserved powers are, in James Madison’s words, “numerous and indefinite,” but delegated powers are “few and defined.”
A state’s power to enter into a compact with other states is reserved in nature, and it almost always involves other reserved powers, such as taxation and water use. Such was the compact examined by the Supreme Court in the U.S. Steel case.
As for delegated powers, the Constitution grants most of these to agents of the federal government. However, it also grants some to entities outside the federal government. Recipients include state legislatures, state governors, state and federal conventions, and p**********l e*****rs.
The scope of delegated powers is “defined” by the Constitution’s language, construed in light of its underlying purpose and its historical context. If state lawmakers or officers try to employ a delegated power in a way not sanctioned by its purpose and scope, the courts intervene.
For example, the courts often have voided efforts to exercise delegated powers in the constitutional amendment process in ways inconsistent with purpose or historical understanding. This is true even if the attempt superficially complies with the Constitution’s text.
Like a state legislature’s authority to act in the amendment process, its power to decide how e*****rs are appointed is a delegated one. In exercising it, the legislature must comply with the overall purpose of the p**********l e******n system and the historical understandings surrounding it. For example, the Founders, including those who approved the 12th amendment, designed the system to serve multiple interests, not merely candidate popularity. And they conceived of an e*****r as a person who acted on behalf of the people of his state—much like a legislator, but with more limited functions.
In deciding how e*****rs are appointed, state lawmakers may choose among a range of procedures. But they have a constitutional duty to choose a method consistent with the e*******l system’s purpose and design. Attempting to convert e*****rs into agents of other states—like selling them to the highest bidder—would be an unconstitutional breach of public trust.
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