MarvinSussman

Whatever were the stated war objectives, reason should prevail.

This is not about my opinion. It's about Admiral Leahy's opinion..

Deal with it. I can't.

Loki Loc: Georgia

Opinions differed then as they do now. You certainly have the right to your own. The preponderance of opinion, however, held that the Japanese were not nearly as ready to surrender as some thought, and their continued intransigence would have resulted in FAR more civilian deaths than the use of the bomb. The firebombing of Tokyo caused 100,000 casualties. The non A bomb option would have included more firebombing which would have resulted in even more civilian deaths, or firebombing the rice harvest to starve them, or an invasion which would have been an incredible bloodbath. The Japanese offers of surrender were about like the current Iran "agreement." They basically wanted a cessation of hostilities, while they kept what was left of their military and their captured Asian territory. This was completely out of sync with the stated US objectives.

MarvinSussman

You are guessing what the Japanese wanted. Your guess is irrelevant. If you want to be helpful, dig up the opinions of the Admiral's contemporaries.

Loki Loc: Georgia

You did not read a word of the links I provided. Why should I provide more?

MarvinSussman

Your links justified the war against Japan which is not an issue. They did not justify the demand for unconditional surrender instead of granting Japan's right to keep the emperor and ending the war.

Loki Loc: Georgia

As I said, you did not read the links. They showed the reasoning behind the bomb, and the alternatives to using it.

MarvinSussman

I read the links. None of them dealt with the statements of Leahy, Eisenhower, MacArthur, and others.

None of them dealt with a demonstration bombing in Tokyo Bay that would have terrified the emperor and the general staff.

etc., etc.

Loki Loc: Georgia

The consensus was to use the bomb. I'm fairly certain they probably had access to intelligence that you or I do not.

MarvinSussman

Leahy, Eisenhower, MacArthur, etc. ABSOLUTELY had more access to intelligence than you do.

You lose, loser!

Loki Loc: Georgia

I am trying to hold a civil debate with you, due to the fact that you are a WWII vet. You are making it very difficult. The fact is that your opinion, and the opinions of the historical figures you quote, were in a minority. Your agreement with them does not make them a majority.
I believe your Admiral Leahy also said the following:


"That is the biggest fool thing we have ever done. The atomic bomb will never go off, and I speak as an expert in explosives"—Admiral Leahy to President Truman, in 1945.

He was also wrong about the naval blockade. His way would have either given the US a Pyrrhic victory, accepting Japan's unacceptable surrender offer, or the war would have been prolonged, resulting in the death by starvation and disease of far more civilians than the A bomb killed. More than 100,000 civilians died in the fire-bombing of Tokyo. That's nearly as many as either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Plans had been made to firebomb the rice fields and starve the Japanese. Maybe you think a slow death by starvation and disease is more humane than a quick one by a bomb. The FACT that you will not admit is that absent the use of the A bomb, the firebombing of Japanese cities would have continued with far more loss of life than that caused by the 2 A bombs. Once more, in case you misread; the firebombing of Tokyo caused almost as many deaths by conventional bombing as the A bomb did in Nagasaki. Put that in your "no nukes" pipe and smoke it.

MarvinSussman

You are ignoring two central questions:
{1} Would dropping the bomb in Tokyo bay have been enough?

(2) Did the Japanese offer to surrender if they could keep the emperor? Read the last line of the following. Was Acheson right or wrong.

The problem of Unconditional Surrender

But unconditional surrender would still leave the doves' central issue unanswered: would surrender allow Japan to retain the Emperor? Japan's Prime Minister Suzuki spelled out the problem of "unconditional surrender" well for doves and hawks alike when he publicly announced on June 9, 1945, "Should the emperor system be abolished, they [the Japanese people] would lose all reason for existence. 'Unconditional surrender', therefore, means death to the hundred million: it leaves us no choice but to go on fighting to the last man." (DML, pg. 127; JDTS, pg. 69(44n)). From this time on, if not earlier, the Allies knew that the throne was the primary issue for Japan. While Japanese military leaders preferred additional conditions for ending the war, ultimately their control proved to be secondary to the desire of the Emperor - and Japan's doves - for surrender.

Much has been written about the vagueness of the Allies' call for "unconditional surrender". This vagueness, combined with many hostile references to Japan's leaders (Henry Stimson & McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service In Peace and War, pg. 626; JDTS, pg. 136), contributed heavily to the conclusion by many in Japan that unconditional surrender could mean the end of their emperor. Even Foreign Minister Togo, one of the leaders of Japan's doves, noted in a July 12, 1945 message to Sato, Japan's Ambassador to Moscow, "as long as America and England insist on unconditional surrender, our country has no alternative but to see it [the war] through in an all-out effort". The telegram was intercepted by the U.S., decoded, and sent to President Truman (Potsdam 1, pg. 873, 875-876).

Robert Butow has aptly portrayed the feelings the Japanese had for the emperor, in noting, "The one thing they could not do was sign a death warrant for the imperial house", and if it appeared that the Allies would take steps against the Emperor, "then even the most ardent advocates of peace would fall into step behind the [pro-war] fanatics" (JDTS, pg. 141).

To demand unconditional surrender, without comment as to the Emperor's fate, meant a choice, Truman thought, between an invasion of the Japanese mainland or the use of atomic bombs on Japan, or possibly both. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall thought that even after using A-bombs on Japan the invasion would still be necessary, anyway, as opposed to the belief that using atomic bombs on Japan would make the mainland invasion unnecessary (David Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Volume Two, pg. 198).

Most high-level discussions that assumed either nuclear weapons or a mainland invasion of Japan would be necessary to end the Pacific war did so with the knowledge that unconditional surrender was the official Allied policy, and so retention of the emperor would probably not be offered to Japan. Nor was a warning to Japan of the atomic bomb in the decision-makers plans, as they considered what would be necessary to end the war. These omissions made the atomic bomb seem all the more necessary.


U.S. learns of Emperor's importance

The U.S. government was not ignorant of the importance of the emperor to Japanese surrender. Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew had explained this to President Truman in person on May 28, 1945. Grew had been U.S. Ambassador to Japan for 10 years prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and was regarded as the most knowledgeable on Japan of any U.S. government official (IWT, pg. 274). On May 28th Grew informed Truman, "The greatest obstacle to unconditional surrender by the Japanese is their belief that this would entail the destruction or permanent removal of the Emperor and the institution of the throne" (Walter Johnson, ed., Turbulent Era, Joseph Grew, Vol. 2, pg. 1428-1429).

In a June 18, 1945 meeting with Truman and his military advisors, Assistant Secretaryof War John McCloy argued that Japan should be permitted to retain the Emperor and should be given a warning of the atomic bomb in order to bring an earlier and less deadly surrender (Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, pg. 70-71; Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed, The Decision To Drop the Bomb, pg. 134-136).

On June 28, 1945, a memo from Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard was given to Sec. of War Stimson. In the memo, Bard recommended the points made by McCloy and suggested Japan be told that Russia would enter the war against them (Manhattan Engineering District Records, Harrison-Bundy files, folder # 77, National Archives). Bard may have also discussed this memo with Truman in early July (Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope, pg. 52-53; altho 15 years later, Bard did not recall the meeting: U.S. News & World Report, 8/15/60, War Was Really Won Before We Used A-bomb, pg. 73).

On July 2, 1945, Sec. of War Henry Stimson and Truman discussed a proposal by Stimson to call for Japan to surrender. Stimson's memo to the President advised, "I personally think that if in saying this we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty, it would substantially add to the chances of acceptance". Stimson's proposed surrender demand stated that the reformed Japanese government "may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty" (Potsdam 1, pg. 889-894).

However, this line was not included in the surrender demand, known as the Potsdam Proclamation, that was broadcast on July 26th, in spite of Stimson's eleventh hour protestations that it be left in (Diary of Henry L. Stimson, 7/24/45, Yale Univ. Library, New Haven, Conn). Pacific war historian Akira Iriye explains, "One reason for this change [the removal of the emperor retention line] was the growing influence within the State Department of men like [Sec. of State] Byrnes, Acheson, and MacLeish - with no expertise on Japanese affairs but keenly sensitive to public opinion - and the president's tendency to listen to them rather than to Grew and other experts." (PAC, pg. 255-256). In regard to his disagreement with Under Sec. of State Grew over allowing Japan to retain the Emperor, Dean Acheson later admitted, "I very shortly came to see that I was quite wrong." (Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, pg. 112-113).

Loki Loc: Georgia

Other Japanese conditions were retention of conquered territory and no punishment for the war criminals responsible for the deaths of so many civilians, and prisoners. They basically wanted a cease fire with all the advantages accruing to them.

MarvinSussman

Are you saying that my last post was a deliberately incomplete statement of the facts? Was Acheson a fool?

Loki Loc: Georgia

I did not say it was deliberate.

MarvinSussman

You have info I don't have and would need to comment.