(Continued from above, apparently it didn’t fit here either, lol)


I’m almost on board....


I totally agree and understand. Honestly, I don’t see much argument between us, some minor details maybe, but overall I’d say we agree more than disagree.

StraightUp.... I would just like to say, I think you’re probably the most articulate person I’ve ever met on a forum like this. You’re bright, respectful, blunt, and honest. If for wh**ever reason we don’t continue this discussion, it has been my great pleasure to make your acquaintance. Thank you.

(I apologize for the delay, I was called away for work purposes that involved a two day drive or there about. I’m all done here and heading back home, so if I don’t get back to you on this for a couple days, you know why. And thanks for your patience these past couple of days.)

I tried to “quote reply” to your original post, but it wouldn’t fit.

I understood what you were saying. I was just hoping that you would have provided an example of this illusion in the context of Mr. England’s speech. But it’s neither here nor there, I understand your point, we don’t need to split any hairs over this because, for the most part I agree with you. Thank you for taking the time to explain.

Fair enough. I just wanted to point out that that isn’t the sole publication to which he contributes. Others, to include Christian Science Monitor, and The Washington Times, are hardly bastions of conservative policy, especially the latter, at least not to the same extent as HF. But again, your point is fair.

Lol! Funny, and true. Though I still think it’s a little unfair not to apply the same standard. But again, not a hair worth the time to split.

In total agreement with the bias aspect. But not very clear as to where Mr. England encouraged any false impression in his speech. It’s obviously your choice if you wish to clarify, I’d like to read it, but it’s not a big hang up for me.

Who he is as an individual is what makes him attractive to HF, his involvement with HF didn’t make him the individual he is. Nor does his involvement with CSM, or The Washington Times. Again, no big deal, I’m not really even arguing your point, just wanted to express how I see it in my mind.

Absolutely agree. But I still can’t see where in his speech even a covert or even a subliminal message of suppression of free will. I think where we might be crossing lines of thought is in the area of who in the EC process elects the president. It’s not the people per say, but the states. The people have the free will to v**e for whom ever they want. Even the e*****rs themselves are not bound to v**e inline with the people. Such as the case for example, Colorado in 2016. But I think we’ll touch further on this below.

Yes, I understand your logic as to how the distribution of representatives suppresses free will. I just don’t agree. Again, I think we’ll touch further on this part, below.

Indeed you have. I just disagree that Mr. England is implying covertly, advocating for the suppression of free will. For the reason I mentioned above.

Absolutely! To add even maintaining its existence. Which I believe is the intent behind his speech.

Well, I was confused in the beginning, but your sk**ls in articulating your point(s) has cleared that up. I think we’re good now; thank you.

This is where I’m still a little hazy on your position. What, exactly, is the problem with the current distribution? Each state receives an e*******l v**e per the number of their representatives. Using the states you used earlier, California has 55, Wyoming has 3. Are you suggesting that it’s unfair for California to contribute to 20.37 % of the e*******l college, while Wyoming contributes 1.1 %? This would make for a fun discussion, unless I’m completely misunderstanding what your problem is...

It is rather bizarre, lol.

Agreed! Slogans, as well as labeling the ”others”.

I have a theory about this, but I would like to wait and see your response to my questions in regards to this up above. The only thing I can say here is, again, the people don’t directly elect the president. (Obviously) And since you have no issues with the EC in and of itself, I would need further clarification. I think we’re close to something, I just want to be more sure.

I agree with the premise, just not in agreement with your view about his support for v**er suppression. Again, here, I think we can agree to disagree.

It doesn’t, but you said he was implying something. All I was asking is for you to state what his underlying implication was, and you did, by saying, v**er suppression. And it’s fine with me that you see this, I just don’t agree is all.

True. Which is why it would require a search history. If someone decided last week that it was going to be their foundational belief, then that would hold less weight with me as opposed to someone like England who, in my experience, has always held such a belief. And he actually supports it.

I think the missing element here is the difference between what the e******ns are for. For example, e******ns for POTUS, and e******ns for representatives. The former is won by winning states, the latter by majority v**e (post 1913 and the ratification of the 17 amendment, modifying Article I, Section III). Prior to that, the Senate was picked by legislatures.

No. I’m saying that states decide p**********l e******ns. But all v**ers take part in v****g.

Amen to that!

True, we would. But, something must’ve got lost in t***slation. Yes, technically, the flip side of the coin to tyranny of the majority is tyranny of the minority, but that’s not what I’m saying is happening, or advocating. I’m saying that one of the foundational American traditions is protecting the minority, and the smallest minority is the individual. We mustn’t let the majority v**e away the rights of the minority. Nor should we let the minority v**e away the rights of the majority. But we sort of do today when we let the SCOTUS legislate from the bench, regarding mostly societal issues. But that’s a separate issue, I don’t want to distract from our conversation.

That’s a fair point to make in justification of your problem. (the one you stated above). But that hasn’t been an issue (technically) for more than 150 years. (But I’m not arguing your point)

Interesting, and I agree. I believe it was Bastiat though that stated our system was as near a miracle as a nation could get. I happen to like our system. Would I like to make a few changes? Sure. But for now I’m good.

This is the further down part I mentioned above. To reiterate: it’s not the v**ers (or population) that directly elect the POTUS, but the e*****rs, as I’m sure you know. So here’s my counter problem... at 55 e*****rs, California influences 20.37% of the EC v**e, while Wyoming with 3 e*****rs, influences 1.1% - the disproportionate influence by representation of each state’s population is almost nil in the grand scheme of it all. The difference being a little more than 100k people. That may seem significant to some, but in respect to electing the president, I’m not one them.

I agree to the approach of a case by case basis. Regional conflicts have subsets, they may be political, economic, environmental, or social. So I’ll present a political one, that seems to have also morphed into a social one as well: The right to keep and bare arms, and how that right is not to be infringed.

Agreed.

Excellent! Repeal the 17th amendment, right?
(Continued below)

You’re welcome. Thanks, I’ll take that under advisement.

Thanks for your opinion.

The facts are there, because they have already been validated, that’s why they’re called facts. I am curious as to which part(s) you found to be misleading. If you’re willing to expand on that, I’d like to read it.

Not sure why you make the connection to the Heritage Foundation. Is it just because he contributes to the Heritage Guide? If that’s the case then, you’d have to apply your standard to the Wall Street Journal, and the other publications he contributes to. Fact is, he was invited as a guest speaker to Hillsdale College to speak as an individual, not to push any of the listed publications’ agendas. Your singular focus on the Heritage Foundation says more to me than anything else.

Well it’s a good thing you acknowledge it as fact, because, it is. The distinction between law and will was omitted because that wasn’t his point. He certainly doesn’t advocate for the suppression of free will. Reading any of his other writings clearly demonstrates this.

Where in this speech did you read this “implication”? What he is doing, is defending what is already LAW, the Constitution, in which is contained the method of the E*******l College system.

Surely it would. But again, I don’t see where in his speech such an implication exists. It would also contradict Mr. England’s foundational beliefs, which are mostly based on individual personal responsibility, and free will. In no way, fashion, or form does England attempt to suppress free will. If anything his speech shines a spotlight on the suppression of the free will of those in the minority in the case of a national popular v**e.

Not one group, but all v**ers, like it has always been done. Red, blue, and purple.

I agree, and share the same concern. But at the same time, we have always had to carry such a heavy burden. Generations of past have shown good, bad, and indifference. What’s important is education for future generations.

I agree. And would add, not only endure, but actively oppose, by any means within reason and law.

Not scared. But, scoff at the notion of majority rule, to expose its idiocy, and the inevitable tyranny it leads to. A fact of which you already conceded. Why would would I have to move to China? Restraints against majority rule are codified in our Constitution. Perhaps I’ll consider it if the NPV movement actually accomplishes a constitutional amendment. Honestly, I don’t think I’ll be going anywhere soon.

Again with the Heritage Foundation... dude, he’s only an occasional contributor, same as he is with the other publications listed. He left it all out because it doesn’t apply, that’s your perceived implication. Mr. England recognizes that all law is force, which, again, is counter to his fundamental beliefs.

I would like to thank you for taking the time to read the speech, and sharing your thoughts and opinions. I’ve found not many here like to read more than say a couple of paragraphs. With that said; thank you.

I never figured you for a segregationist. You’re obviously triggered by something you know very little about. The “minority” doesn’t rule the “majority” - you seem to be pissed off that your “majority” can’t run roughshod over those you look down your nose at.

Lack of Knowledge Is a Dangerous Thing

Constitution Day—September 17—marks the anniversary of its 1787 signing. Students will be taught about it...but not because of its importance. It is now a mandatory topic for every educational institution receiving federal aid. However, what won’t be taught is the irony of that requirement, which originated from the man then-described as the Senate’s leading Constitutional scholar, while clearly conflicting with the Constitution.

In 2004, Senator Robert Byrd (D.-WV) added this requirement to a pork-filled spending bill that was blatantly inconsistent with Americans’ general welfare. It also clearly overstepped the 10th Amendment’s restriction of the federal government to only its enumerated powers.

His “solution” aside, Byrd was correct about Americans’ inadequate Constitutional knowledge. As one National Constitution Center poll concluded, only one in six of us claimed detailed knowledge of the Constitution—despite the fact that two-thirds said it was “absolutely essential” to have.

In other words, Americans know too little about our Constitution to maintain the freedoms it was designed to protect. Instead, our ignorance leads us to sacrificing rights out of undue deference to majority rule.

America’s Constitution did not endorse majority rule. Our founders did believe in v****g to select who should be entrusted with the power of government, but the more important and prior question they addressed was: “What powers do the people delegate to the federal government to exercise on their behalf?” That is why so much of the Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, is dev**ed to what the government is notallowed to do, regardless of majority sentiment. As Jefferson said, our founders fought not for democracy, but for a government “tied down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.”

In fact, our founders had a great distrust of majority rule. Alexander Hamilton asserted that “Real liberty is not found in the extremes of democracy.” James Madison said “democracies…have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.” Thomas Jefferson warned that “an elective despotism was not the government we fought for,” and that “The majority, oppressing an individual, is guilty of a crime, abuses its strength, and by acting on the law of the strongest breaks up the foundations of society.”

That is why the Constitution contains multiple non-majority rules to protect Americans against federal abuses, such as p**********l veto power and the super-majorities required to change the Constitution. Its defense is the rationale for the Supreme Court’s power to strike down unconstitutional laws, regardless of how many congressional v**es they received.

“Individual rights are not subject to a public v**e."

Despite our founders’ antipathy toward pure majority rule, many today feel that our founders’ opposition to unlimited democracy can be squared with political determination of everything by adding the phrase, “also protecting the rights of the minority.” However, as Ayn Rand put it, “Individual rights are not subject to a public v**e; a majority has no right to v**e away the rights of a minority; the political function of rights is precisely to protect minorities from oppression by majorities (and the smallest minority on earth is the individual).” Consequently, our lack of Constitutional knowledge means that believing in protecting the rights of minorities does not actually protect them when they are outv**ed.

Since Americans don’t clearly understand their Constitutional rights against government abuse, the unwise habit of deference to political majorities results in those rights being steamrollered whenever more than 50% v**e to do so. Examples are plentiful because—despite the Constitution’s imposition of strictly limited, enumerated federal powers—there is no area it does not now reach, if not dominate. And with our protections eroding, majority v****g controls more and more of what our founders thought they had made off-limits to political determination.

Sadly, as we can’t effectively defend what we are only vaguely aware of, American inattention to the highest law of the land puts our most essential rights and liberties at risk. We may think we have inalienable rights, as the Declaration of Independence asserts. But those rights are protected by the Constitution only if we know what they are and we remember that the federal government was not granted power to take them away based on any simple majority v**e. Unless we once again take our rights as seriously as our founders and vigorously defend the Constitutional safeguards that maintain them—even against majority pressures—the system of self-government our founders left us will continue to erode. But when we don’t even recognize the irony of a federal mandate to promote understanding of the Constitution, especially when it is inconsistent with the Constitution, we are unprepared to do anything to effectively preserve its protections against government abuse.

By: Gary M. Galles

(He is a professor of economics at Pepperdine University. His recent books include Faulty Premises, Faulty Policies (2014) and Apostle of Peace (2013).

Since the dawn of history man has vainly sought to ordain order and advance social justice through political legalism. Liberty, equal­ity, brotherhood, justice, security, freedom—and especially self-gov­ernment—have long enjoyed stat­ure in political clichés.

On the surface, democracy seems to encompass all social ideals and appears to be the epit­ome of political government. The motivating principle asserts the inherent right of all to participate in government and determine pub­lic policy. But with unquestioned power invested in popular opinion, democratic idealism deteriorates rapidly into government by organ­ized majorities.

Even the authoritarian majori­ties who imagine themselves self-governed have no real understanding of political subterfuge and simply endorse wh**ever their leaders are pleased to tell them. And since it is easier to subjugate and manipulate those who believe themselves free, the grand illusion of freedom and self-government is carefully preserved by the strat­egists who constantly maneuver behind the democratic stage.

Since democracy is not of itself a stable form of government, but rather a method of ordaining so­cial change, all forms of political tyranny can easily win the en­dorsement of the majority. The irresponsible elements of any so­ciety are readily persuaded to state-sponsored beggary on the as­surance their personal problems will be miraculously solved by some political nostrum a clever candidate advises them to try. To exercise control over an apparent­ly self-governed democracy is only to understand and utilize the principles of mass psychology. The demagogues who successfully ex­ploit social and economic disorders and identify themselves with the majority, ultimately attain oli­garchic power.

Democracy has always enjoyed broad acclaim as the champion of political justice. But history amply indicates that government by pop­ular opinion has spawned nothing but social and moral chaos. No matter how wisely begun, sk**lful­ly expedited, or enlightened the self-governed, the self-governed states have followed similar pat­terns of degeneration to mob an­archy. When laws fail, the anarchy must be brought under control by some form of dictatorial govern­ment, until counterrevolution in time completes the cycle by return­ing political process to the hands of the people. The entire gamut precludes human liberty and so­cial justice, as political instability insures social disorder and minor­ity oppression in every phase.

Political societies and their vari­ous governments have come and gone while man has been advanc­ing his civilization, but the basic problems attendant to human re­lationships continue. Many, now as in the past, despairingly believe it is fundamentally more sound and morally easier to be controlled by an illusionary self-governed legal system than to master the art of governing oneself.

As free moral agents, individ­uals tend to seek justice through spiritual values, while individuals acting collectively seek favoritism through deliberate applications of political injustice. Individuals must laboriously ponder justice through conscience, while political majorities have only to embrace an ideology to have it automati­cally proclaimed morally correct regardless of the injustice it may inflict. Despotism, no matter by what name it masquerades, is quick to exploit this human in­fatuation with group motivation. Human progress depends entirely upon the intrinsic moral judg­ment of self-governed individu­als, politically controlled in the minimum degree that prevents infringement on the human rights and opportunities of others.

Constitutional legalism is both the ancient and modern political antidote for democratic oppres­sion. But no matter how eloquent­ly it defines the rights and virtues of individuals or how boldly it af­firms opposition to majority in­justice, it is still only a document of public intention. If the inten­tion of the society changes, the constitution is automatically in­validated. Reappraisals of constitutional application are continually substi­tuted for original intent when le­galism no longer reflects the true spirit of the society it governs. Constitutional legalism may ac­curately recognize the basic dif­ferences in human desires, initia­tives, and capabilities, and assure that the fruits of human effort will be equitably divided in direct proportion to contribution. It may also impartially administer jus­tice. But as soon as the legal sys­tem appears less than perfect to a majority that lacks the human en­ergies necessary to utilize its per­fections, the endless search for the golden mean of political medioc­rity resumes.

The best government, and the only government that will perma­nently benefit mankind, is intro­spection; for it alone can identify true social responsibilities and teach us to govern ourselves with moral restraint. Human life de­mands effective living. Effective living demands that the human spirit be allowed to seek and at­tain justification through self-chosen channels. The greatest and most far-reaching contributions to the cause of human enlighten­ment have never developed from majority opinions, but rather from inspired individuals quite often at odds with their contempo­raries. The only restraint that can ever be imposed on the democratic oppression that stifles human spirit is the power of personal character, developed through the moral growth of self-sufficient in­dividuals.

As man apprehensively surveys the future, he is inclined to believe that the world has only to turn to the self-government of democracy to bring human problems to a swift and happy conclusion. But externally applied self-governing political concepts, no matter how lofty their legal and moral intent, can never provide mankind with a hopeful future. Mankind must learn to govern from deep within the individual; and when man at last has mastered himself, respon­sible human relationships will be the first and most important by­products of his accomplishment.

By: Robert K. Newell

Mr. Newell operates a farm near Marcellus, Michigan, one of his "crops" being an oc­casional article.

Thanks Manning5!

I assume you enjoyed the historical references to your state. Historically powerful stuff...

(Continued from above)


Of course, no state would do this unilaterally, so NPV has a “trigger”: it only takes effect if adopted by enough states to control 270 e*******l v**es—in other words, a majority that would control the outcome of p**********l e******ns. So far, 14 states and the District of Columbia have signed on, with a total of 189 e*******l v**es.

Until this year, every state that had joined NPV was heavily Democratic: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. The NPV campaign has struggled to win other Democratic states: Delaware only adopted it this year and it still has not passed in Oregon (though it may soon). Following the 2018 e******n, Democrats came into control of both the legislatures and the governorships in the purple states of Colorado and New Mexico, which have subsequently joined NPV.

NPV would have the same effect as abolishing the E*******l College. Fraud in one state would affect every state, and the only way to deal with it would be to give more power to the federal government. E******ns that are especially close would require nationwide recounts. Candidates could win based on intense support from a narrow region or from big cities. NPV also carries its own unique risks: despite its name, the plan cannot actually create a national popular v**e. Each state would still—at least for the time being—run its own e******ns. This means a patchwork of rules for everything from which candidates are on the b****t to how disputes are settled. NPV would also reward states with lax e******n laws—the higher the turnout, legal or not, the more power for that state. Finally, each NPV state would certify its own “national” v**e total. But what would happen when there are charges of skullduggery? Would states really trust, with no power to verify, other state’s returns?

Uncertainty and litigation would likely follow. In fact, NPV is probably unconstitutional. For one thing, it ignores the Article I, Section 10 requirement that interstate compacts receive congressional consent. There is also the fact that the structure of the E*******l College clause of the Constitution implies there is some limit on the power of state legislatures to ignore the will of their state’s people.

One danger of all these attacks on the E*******l College is, of course, that we lose the state-by-state system designed by the Framers and its protections against regionalism and fraud. This would alter our politics in some obvious ways—shifting power toward urban centers, for example—but also in ways we cannot know in advance. Would an increase in presidents who win by small pluralities lead to a rise of splinter parties and spoiler candidates? Would fears of e******n f***d in places like Chicago and Broward County lead to demands for greater federal control over e******ns?

The more fundamental danger is that these attacks undermine the Constitution as a whole. Arguments that the Constitution is outmoded and that democracy is an end in itself are arguments that can just as easily be turned against any of the constitutional checks and balances that have preserved free government in America for well over two centuries. The measure of our fundamental law is not whether it actualizes the general will—that was the point of the French Revolution, not the American. The measure of our Constitution is whether it is effective at encouraging just, stable, and free government—government that protects the rights of its citizens.

The E*******l College is effective at doing this. We need to preserve it, and we need to help our fellow Americans understand why it matters.

By: Trent England

(He is executive vice president and the David and Ann Brown Distinguished Fellow at the Oklahoma Council of Public Affairs, where he also directs the Save Our States project. He earned his B.A. in government from Claremont McKenna College and his J.D. from the George Mason University School of Law. He previously served as executive vice president of the Freedom Foundation and as a legal policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation. He hosts the podcast, The Trent England Show, and has written for numerous publications, including The Wall Street Journal, Christian Science Monitor, and The Washington Times. He is a contributor to The Heritage Guide to the Constitution.)

The Danger of the Attacks on the E*******l College

The following is adapted from a speech delivered on April 30, 2019, at Hillsdale College’s Allan P. Kirby, Jr. Center for Constitutional Studies and Citizenship in Washington, D.C.

Once upon a time, the E*******l College was not controversial. During the debates over ratifying the Constitution, Anti-Federalist opponents of ratification barely mentioned it. But by the mid-twentieth century, opponents of the E*******l College nearly convinced Congress to propose an amendment to scrap it. And today, more than a dozen states have joined in an attempt to hijack the E*******l College as a way to force a national popular v**e for president.

What changed along the way? And does it matter? After all, the critics of the E*******l College simply want to elect the president the way we elect most other officials. Every state governor is chosen by a statewide popular v**e. Why not a national popular v**e for president?

Delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1787 asked themselves the same question, but then rejected a national popular v**e along with several other possible modes of p**********l e******n. The Virginia Plan—the first draft of what would become the new Constitution­—called for “a National Executive . . . to be chosen by the National Legislature.” When the Constitutional Convention took up the issue for the first time, near the end of its first week of debate, Roger Sherman from Connecticut supported this parliamentary system of e******n, arguing that the national executive should be “absolutely dependent” on the legislature. Pennsylvania’s James Wilson, on the other hand, called for a popular e******n. Virginia’s George Mason thought a popular e******n “impracticable,” but hoped Wilson would “have time to digest it into his own form.” Another delegate suggested e******n by the Senate alone, and then the Convention adjourned for the day.

When they reconvened the next morning, Wilson had taken Mason’s advice. He presented a plan to create districts and hold popular e******ns to choose e*****rs. Those e*****rs would then v**e for the executive—in other words, an e*******l college. But with many details left out, and uncertainty remaining about the nature of the executive office, Wilson’s proposal was v**ed down. A week later, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts proposed e******n by state governors. This too was v**ed down, and a consensus began to build. Delegates did not support the Virginia Plan’s parliamentary model because they understood that an executive selected by Congress would become subservient to Congress. A similar result, they came to see, could be expected from assigning the se******n to any body of politicians.

There were other oddball proposals that sought to salvage congressional se******n—for instance, to have congressmen draw lots to form a group that would then choose the executive in secret. But by July 25, it was clear to James Madison that the choice was down to two forms of popular e******n: “The option before us,” he said, “[is] between an appointment by E*****rs chosen by the people—and an immediate appointment by the people.” Madison said he preferred popular e******n, but he recognized two legitimate concerns. First, people would tend toward supporting candidates from their own states, giving an advantage to larger states. Second, a few areas with higher concentrations of v**ers might come to dominate. Madison spoke positively of the idea of an e*******l college, finding that “there would be very little opportunity for cabal, or corruption” in such a system.

By August 31, the Constitution was nearly finished—except for the process of electing the president. The question was put to a committee comprised of one delegate from each of the eleven states present at the Convention. That committee, which included Madison, created the E*******l College as we know it today. They presented the plan on September 4, and it was adopted with minor changes. It is found in Article II, Section 1:

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of E*****rs, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.

Federal officials were prohibited from being e*****rs. E*****rs were required to cast two b****ts, and were prohibited from casting both b****ts for candidates from their own state. A deadlock for president would be decided by the House of Representatives, with one v**e per state. Following that, in case of a deadlock for vice president, the Senate would decide. Also under the original system, the runner up became vice president.

This last provision caused misery for President John Adams in 1796, when his nemesis, Thomas Jefferson, became his vice president. Four years later it nearly robbed Jefferson of the presidency when his unscrupulous running mate, Aaron Burr, tried to parlay an accidental deadlock into his own e******n by the House. The Twelfth Amendment, ratified in 1804, fixed all this by requiring e*****rs to cast separate v**es for president and vice president.

And there things stand, constitutionally at least. State legislatures have used their power to direct the manner of choosing e*****rs in various ways: appointing them directly, holding e******ns by district, or holding statewide e******ns. Today, 48 states choose their p**********l e*****rs in a statewide, winner-take-all v**e. Maine and Nebraska elect one e*****r based on each congressional district’s v**e and the remaining two based on the statewide v**e.

It is easy for Americans to forget that when we v**e for president, we are really v****g for e*****rs who have pledged to support the candidate we favor. Civics education is not what it used to be. Also, perhaps, the E*******l College is a victim of its own success. Most of the time, it shapes American politics in ways that are beneficial but hard to see. Its effects become news only when a candidate and his or her political party lose a hard-fought and narrowly decided e******n.

So what are the beneficial effects of choosing our presidents through the E*******l College?

Under the E*******l College system, p**********l e******ns are decentralized, taking place in the states. Although some see this as a flaw—U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren opposes the E*******l College expressly because she wants to increase federal power over e******ns—this decentralization has proven to be of great value.

For one thing, state boundaries serve a function analogous to that of watertight compartments on an ocean liner. Disputes over mistakes or fraud are contained within individual states. Illinois can recount its v**es, for instance, without triggering a nationwide recount. This was an important factor in America’s messiest p**********l e******n—which was not in 2000, but in 1876.

That year marked the first time a p**********l candidate won the e*******l v**e while losing the popular v**e. It was a time of organized suppression of black v**ers in the South, and there were fierce disputes over v**e totals in Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina. Each of those states sent Congress two sets of e*******l v**e totals, one favoring Republican Rutherford Hayes and the other Democrat Samuel Tilden. Just two days before Inauguration Day, Congress finished counting the v**es—which included determining which v**es to count—and declared Hayes the winner. Democrats proclaimed this “the fraud of the century,” and there is no way to be certain today—nor was there probably a way to be certain at the time—which candidate actually won. At the very least, the E*******l College contained these disputes within individual states so that Congress could endeavor to sort it out. And it is arguable that the E*******l College prevented a fraudulent result.

Four years later, the 1880 p**********l e******n demonstrated another benefit of the E*******l College system: it can act to amplify the results of a p**********l e******n. The popular v**e margin that year was less than 10,000 v**es—about one-tenth of one percent—yet Republican James Garfield won a resounding e*******l victory, with 214 e*******l v**es to Democrat Winfield Hancock’s 155. There was no question who won, let alone any need for a recount. More recently, in 1992, the E*******l College boosted the legitimacy of Democrat Bill Clinton, who won with only 43 percent of the popular v**e but received over 68 percent of the e*******l v**e.

But there is no doubt that the greatest benefit of the E*******l College is the powerful incentive it creates against regionalism. Here, the p**********l e******ns of 1888 and 1892 are most instructive. In 1888, incumbent Democratic President Grover Cleveland lost ree******n despite receiving a popular v**e plurality. He won this plurality because he won by very large margins in the overwhelmingly Democratic South. He won Texas alone by 146,461 v**es, for instance, whereas his national popular v**e margin was only 94,530. Altogether he won in six southern states with margins greater than 30 percent, while only tiny Vermont delivered a victory percentage of that size for Republican Benjamin Harrison.

In other words, the E*******l College ensures that winning supermajorities in one region of the country is not sufficient to win the White House. After the Civil War, and especially after the end of Reconstruction, that meant that the Democratic Party had to appeal to interests outside the South to earn a majority in the E*******l College. And indeed, when Grover Cleveland ran again for president four years later in 1892, although he won by a smaller percentage of the popular v**e, he won a resounding E*******l College majority by picking up New York, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and California in addition to winning the South.

Whether we see it or not today, the E*******l College continues to push parties and p**********l candidates to build broad coalitions. Critics say that swing states get too much attention, leaving v**ers in so-called safe states feeling left out. But the legitimacy of a political party rests on all of those safe states—on places that the party has already won over, allowing it to reach farther out. In 2000, for instance, George W. Bush needed every state that he won—not just Florida—to become president. Of course, the E*******l College does put a premium on the states in which the parties are most evenly divided. But would it really be better if the path to the presidency primarily meant driving up the v**e total in the deepest red or deepest blue states?

Also, swing states are the states most likely to have divided government. And if divided government is good for anything, it is accountability. So with the E*******l College system, when we do wind up with a razor-thin margin in an e******n, it is likely to happen in a state where both parties hold some power, rather than in a state controlled by one party.

Despite these benefits of the current system, opponents of the E*******l College maintain that it is unseemly for a candidate to win without receiving the most popular v**es. As Hillary Clinton put it in 2000: “In a democracy, we should respect the will of the people, and to me, that means it’s time to do away with the E*******l College.” Yet similar systems prevail around the world. In parliamentary systems, including Canada, Israel, and the United Kingdom, prime ministers are elected by the legislature. This happens in Germany and India as well, which also have presidents who are elected by something similar to an e*******l college. In none of these democratic systems is the national popular v**e decisive.

More to the point, in our own political tradition, what matters most about every legislative body, from our state legislatures to the House of Representatives and the Senate, is which party holds the majority. That party elects the leadership and sets the agenda. In none of these representative chambers does the aggregate popular v**e determine who is in charge. What matters is winning districts or states.

Nevertheless, there is a clamor of voices calling for an end to the E*******l College. Former Attorney General Eric Holder has declared it “a vestige of the past,” and Washington Governor Jay Inslee has labeled it an “archaic relic of a bygone age.” Almost as one, the current myriad of Democratic p**********l hopefuls have called for abolishing the E*******l College.

Few if any of these Democrats likely realize how similar their party’s position is to what it was in the late nineteenth century, with California representing today what the South was for their forebears. The Golden State accounted for 10.4 percent of p**********l v**es cast in 2016, while the southern states (from South Carolina down to Florida and across to Texas) accounted for 10.6 percent of p**********l v**es cast in 1888. Grover Cleveland won those southern states by nearly 39 percent, while Hillary Clinton won California by 30 percent. But rather than following Cleveland’s example of building a broader national coalition that could win in the E*******l College, today’s Democrats would rather simply change the rules.

Anti-E*******l College amendments with bipartisan support in the 1950s and 1970s failed to receive the two-thirds v**es in Congress they needed in order to be sent to the states for consideration. Likewise today, partisan amendments will not make it through Congress. Nor, if they did, could they win ratification among the states.

But there is a serious threat to the E*******l College. Until recently, it has gone mostly unnoticed, as it has made its way through various state legislatures. If it works according to its supporters’ intent, it would nullify the E*******l College by creating a de facto direct e******n for president.

The National Popular V**e Interstate Compact, or NPV, takes advantage of the flexibility granted to state legislatures in the Constitution: “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of E*****rs.” The original intent of this was to allow state legislators to determine how best to represent their state in p**********l e******ns. The e*****rs represent the state—not just the legislature—even though the latter has power to direct the manner of appointment. By contrast, NPV supporters argue that this power allows state legislatures to ignore their state’s v**ers and appoint e*****rs based on the national popular v**e. This is what the compact would require states to do.

(Continued below)

I was going to respond with something similar, Jim. Only to add, maybe it’s time for a reckoning, time to water the Tree of Liberty so to speak. We’re always just one generation removed from losing our hard fought freedoms, or more accurately, “educated” (read as indoctrinated) away from them.

Can’t say for sure, Hug. But if there is it’s most likely Hillsdale.

Uhhh... that’s such a dream of mine. Unfortunately today that’s as likely as Unicorns, Sasquatch, and the Loch Ness Monster.

Thanks Deb, that’s very much appreciated.

(Continued from above)
The Northwest Ordinance sums up, in Article II, what may well be considered a contemporary consensus of the protections of the rights of the people most needed:

The inhabitants of the said territory shall always be entitled to the benefits of the writs of habeas corpus, and of the trial by jury; of a proportionate representation of the people in the legislature, and judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law. All persons shall be bailable, unless for capital offences, where the proof shall be evident, or the presumption great. All fines shall be moderate; and no cruel or unusual. punishment shall be inflicted. No man shall be deprived of his liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land, and should the public exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation, to take any person’s property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same. And, in the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and declared, that no law ought ever to be made to have force in the said territory, that shall in any manner wh**ever, interfere or affect private contracts, or engagements, bona fide, and without fraud previously formed.[13]

Some recent writers have claimed that the Founders distinguished between "human rights" and property rights in favor of "human rights." It should be clear from the above that no such distinction can be discerned, nor has the present writer ever seen a quotation from the original that could reasonably be construed to show that the Founders made any such distinction.

Property was, however, freed from various feudal restraints during this period and made more fully the possession of the individual holding title to it. The most general encumbrance on property ownership was the quitrent — a periodical payment due to king or proprietor on land, a payment that originated in the late Middle Ages as money payments displaced personal servitude. Such claims were speedily extinguished following the break from England, and land thereafter was held in "fee simple." Such royal prerogatives as the right of the monarch to white pines on private land were, of course, nullified. States abolished entail, also, a move which enhanced the authority of the owner to dispose of his lands.

With the Declaration of Independence, the whole edifice of mercantilism as imposed from England was swept away. One historian describes the impact of this as follows "As a result of the American Revolution, freedom of enterprise, that is, the equal opportunity of any individual to engage in any economic activity he chooses in order to amass wealth, and to hold onto his wealth or dispose of it as he pleases, became a living reality in America to a greater degree than before."[14]

Another sort of innovation may be described as anti-class in its character. Fixed classes are supported and maintained by government where they exist. Americans of this period wanted to remove government support of classes and prevent the growth of special privileges by which classes are shaped. Some of the actions already described were, in part, anti-class measures. For example, the established Church of England was hierarchical and, in England particularly, a major support of class arrangements. Its disestablishment in America struck at the root of government support of class structures. Entailment was a means of perpetuating great estates, just as quitrents were devices for maintaining aristocracies. Other actions were taken that were even more pointedly aimed at removing government from its role as class perpetuator.

One of these was the abolition of primogeniture. Primogeniture was the rule that the estate of one who died without a will should go either whole or in larger part to the eldest son. States abolished this rule and adopted the practice of dividing the estate equally among the children when the father died intestate. The tendency of this was for great estates to be broken up from time to time.

Various sorts of provisions were made in state constitutions to prevent the growth of aristocratic privileges. For example, the Virginia Bill of Rights had this provision:

That no man or set or men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator or judge to be hereditary.[15]

The Massachusetts Declaration held:

No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor t***smissible to children, or descendants, or relations by blood; the idea of a man born a magistrate, lawgiver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural.[16]

The animus against titles of nobility found expression sometimes. So strong was the animus against hereditary positions that the Society of Cincinnati, a voluntary association of officers who had served in the War for Independence, found it expedient to abandon the rule that membership could be inherited to allay the indignation against them. Frequent e******ns and restrictions on the amount of time one could serve in office were efforts to prevent the emergence of a ruling class, at least in part.

The kind of e******y sought by prohibitions against governmentally fostered classes was e******y before the law. So far as any other e******y was concerned, American opinion of the time accepted differences in wealth and social station as inevitable and desirable results of differences in ability and effort. Undoubtedly, there were those in that day who would have liked to have some portions of the wealth and estates of others — who coveted what was not theirs — as there are in any day, but they were either inarticulate or ashamed to profess their views. Some historians have made much ado about the confiscation and sale of Loyalist estates during the war. This is treated as if it were a redistributionist scheme, and there is an attempt to give factual support to this notion by pointing out that large estates were sometimes broken up before they were offered for sale. This did sometimes happen, but it does not follow that it was done with any motive of equalizing holdings. Small parcels attract more bidders than large ones; hence, the price attained for large estates was likely to be increased by dividing them up. Moreover, large estates were sometimes formed or added to by buying several parcels.[17]

There were some general changes in governments during this period, changes in degree from what they had been under British rule. The main tendency was to make the state governments more dependent upon the popular will than they had been during the colonial period. The new state constitutions required that all state officers either be chosen by the e*****rate or appointed by those who had.

The main impetus behind making governments depend more closely on the e*****rate was a profound fear of government. This distrust of government was most clearly shown in the distrust of governors and courts, those parts of the government that had not been popularly chosen during the colonial period. The colonists feared the legislatures, too, or so the limitations on them would indicate, but out of their colonial experience, they feared them less than the other branches. In point of fact, Americans relied rather heavily on a narrow and provincial colonial experience in making their first constitutions. Probably, Massachusetts and New York should be excepted from these strictures.

The office of governor — or wh**ever the executive might be called, for some states abandoned briefly that colonial title — was stripped of much of the power and most of the independence enjoyed by colonial chief executives. Colonial governors had usually possessed an absolute veto over legislation. The new executives were stripped of the veto power in all but two of the states — Massachusetts and New York —, and in these the power was somewhat weakened. In all the states but New York the legislatures or the constitutions governed the assembling and dispersal of the legislative branch. In eight of the states, the chief executive was elected by the legislature, and he was made, thereby, greatly dependent upon it. His tenure of office was usually quite brief. In nine states, it was only twelve months, and nowhere was it for a longer period than three years. To prevent the growth of personal power in the hands of the governor, most state constitutions limited the number of terms he could serve in a given period.[18]

The courts generally were made more dependent on legislatures than they had been formerly. The Pennsylvania constitution described the relationship this way "The judges of the supreme court of judicature shall have fixed salaries, be commissioned for seven years only, though capable of reappointment at the end of that term, but removable for misbehavior at any time by the general assembly…."[19] Even so, the principle of separation of powers generally prevailed as between the courts and the legislature more fully than between governors and legislatures.

The legislatures were subject to frequent e******ns, a device for making them closely dependent upon the e*****rate. In ten of the states the lower house was subject to annual e******ns; in two states their terms were only for six months. The members of the upper house usually had somewhat longer terms, but one state did not even have an upper house.[20] Even so, the powers of the legislatures were quite extensive. Thomas Jefferson complained that in Virginia:

All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, result to the legislative body…. An elective despotism was not the government we fought for, but one which should not only be founded on free principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others.[21]

What had been generally done was this: Americans in establishing their state governments had sought to check them by the e*****rate rather more than by an internal balance of powers. The people could, however, use their influence to abet arbitrary government as well as to check it.

There was also some extension of the franchise during this period. In addition, several legislatures were reapportioned to give inhabitants in the backcountry a more nearly proportionate voice in government. One of the trends, in this connection, was the movement of state capitals inland from the coast to make them more accessible to the back country.

Most of these were changes of degree rather than of kind. To call them revolutionary, as some twentieth century historians have, is a distortion of what happened and a stretching of the meaning of revolution beyond reasonable confines. Insofar as they were changes from what had prevailed, they were culminations of trends long afoot. Americans had been tending toward religious liberty in practice long before they established it in fundamental law. They had been evading, so far as they could, quitrents, primogeniture, and entail. Their new governmental structures embodied much of what they had been contending with the British for. Bills of rights, bicameral legislatures, and weak executives, were built on the British model. The assault on special privilege did run contrary to recent British practice to some extent, but it was quite in accord with what Americans had been doing almost since they had reached the New World. If in their early enthusiasms in government building they did not attend to a broader experience than their colonial one, this did not make their acts revolutionary, only precipitate. They were clear enough that they wanted to protect the individual from government in the enjoyment of his rights; they did not at first realize how much more this took than felicitously phrased declarations. Weak governments do not make liberty and property secure; that is the office of powerful governments internally restrained. Many Americans were to learn this lesson, and that rather quickly. But just as their first experiments were not revolutionary in character, no more were their later alterations a counter-revolution.

By: Clarence Carson

Next: The Critical Period.

—FOOTNOTES—

(1)See Merrill Jensen, The New Nation (New York Vintage Books, 1950), p. 132. Ibid., p. 133.

(3)John Fiske, The Critical Period of American History (Boston Houghton Mifflin, 1916), p. 78.

(4)Jack P. Greene, ed., Colonies to Nation (New York McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 390-91.

(5)Fiske, op. cit., p. 71

(6)Greene, op. cit., p. 397.

(7)Ibid., p. 398.

(8)See Fiske, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

(9)See Robert A. Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights (New York Collier, 1962), p. 109.

(10)Henry S. Commager, ed., Documents of American History, I (New York Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962, 7th ed), 107.

(11)Ibid., p. 104.

(12)Ibid., p. 108.

(13)Greene, op. cit., pp. 472-73.

(14)Dumas Malone and Basil Rauch, Empire for Liberty, I (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1960), 196.

(15)Commager, op. cit., p. 103.

(16 Ibid., p. 108.

(17)See Frederick B. Tolles, "A Reevaluation of the Revolution as a Social Movement," George A. Billias, ed., The American Revolution (New York Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, 2nd ed.), pp. 66-67.

(18)See Richard Hofstadter, et. al., The United States (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1967, 2nd ed.), p. 160.

(19)Greene, op. cit., p. 343.

(20)Hofstadter, op. cit., pp. 159-60.

(21)Quoted in Nelson M. Blake, A History of American Life and Thought (New York McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 100

The Founding of the American Republic: Freeing the Individual
Scribes are quite often merciless tyrants in dealing with characters out of the past, spearing them with an assortment of verbs and freezing them in predetermined categories with their adjectives, much as a butterfly collector does with his helpless insects. There is no surer way to shatter the integrity of an individual or to distort a historical epoch than by the indiscriminate use of categories. No man of wit is likely to believe that a category comprehends him, even when it is well chosen. But when categories drawn from other times and places are imposed upon men and events which are foreign to them, the result can only be to confuse the subject under discussion.

Some twentieth-century historians have done just this to American history of the late eighteenth century. They have called Americans of the time by names, some of which were unknown to them and others which they would have disavowed; they have categorized them as revolutionaries or reactionaries, democrats or aristocrats, nationalists or state’s righters, liberals or conservatives, and other such categories. They have tried to thrust the events into revolutionary and "social" revolutionary categories, categories drawn from other revolutions and other circumstances. It is a journalistic habit into which many historians have fallen to attribute an absoluteness to the views and thrusts of men which violates both what they intend and do. Debates, even great historical debates, can be quite misleading. Men often advance positions with more certainty than they feel, appear to be unalterable in their determination, yet may shortly yield to the other side with good humor when they have lost. Some historians appear to have no difficulty wh**ever in discovering men’s motives, but the fact is that we are not privy to their motives.

The subject to be treated below is the reforms and innovations made by Americans mostly in the decade after the declaring of independence. The above prelude was made necessary because the present writer both wishes to make known the fact that he is familiar with the cross currents of interpretation of these years by twentieth century historians and to disavow many of the categories that have been used. After the Americans broke from England they did make some changes; they did sometimes differ among themselves as to what the direction of change should be; but there is no need to question their motives or any solid basis for saying for certain what they were. Above all, there is no need to push this one into that category and that one into this, with the category being excessively large for the matter at issue and much too confining for the man over any period of time. More rubbish has been written about the class positions and interests of the men of these times than any other in American history, so far as I can make out. The present writer has neither the space nor inclination to spend energy upon trying to refute what has not been well established, in any case.


What is established is that there were some changes made during these years. The main thrust of these changes is the freeing of the individual: freeing him from foreign domination, from various government compulsions, from class prescriptions, and for greater control of his own affairs. And, in conjunction with these, there was an effort to erect safeguards around him that would protect him in the exercise of his rights. The thrust to do these things was made along several different paths, and each of these is worth some attention.

A primary aim of the Americans was independence. They wanted to be independent of England, of course; that was what the war was fought about. Many Americans had come to believe that they could only have the requisite control of their affairs by separating from the mother country. This was achieved, of course, by terms of the Treaty of Paris. But Americans longed also to be independent of European entanglements. Time after time, during the colonial period, Americans had been drawn into wars that originated in Europe but spread to the New World. Americans wanted to be free of the dynastic quarrels, the imperial ambitions, and the trade wars which rended Europe and shook much of the rest of the world. To many Americans, Europe was the symbol and embodiment of corruption, decadence, and foreclosed opportunity. To be independent of Europe was, in the final analysis, to be free to follow courses which had not yet, at any rate, proven to be so laden with disaster.

Independence did not mean, nor should it be taken to connote, the rejection of either the English or European heritage. Indeed, there was little irrational rejection of either heritage that comes to mind. Though Americans rejected European aristocracy they did not, for that reason, change names of places in this country derived from aristocrats.

Perhaps, the most extensive thrust of this period was to the freeing of the individual from government compulsion. Libertarian sentiment had been maturing for some considerable while in America; it was fostered both by legal trends and religious and other intellectual development. Once the break from England came, Americans used the occasion to cut away a body of restraints no longer in accord with their outlook.


Religious liberty was widely secured within a decade or so of the break from England. Much of it came by way of the disestablishment of churches. The establishment most readily dispensed with was that of the Church of England. While the Church of England was established throughout the South as well as in New York, it was not very popular; many of its clergy remained loyal to England, and adherents of it were outnumbered by dissenters in most states. Its disestablishment was made even easier because it was a national church; membership in it was tied to loyalty to the king of England. The Church of England was everywhere speedily disestablished. But these actions were not simply prompted by convenience, for there was increasing belief in religious liberty. Several states had no established churches: namely, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. But they used the opportunity afforded by independence to remove or reduce restrictions. Some of the disabilities of Roman Catholics were cut away.

The established Congregational church was maintained for several decades longer in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire. There was, however, some liberalization in these states. The Massachusetts constitution of 1780 affirmed that every man had the right to worship in his own way, that no church should be subordinated to any other, and that tax moneys could be used to support ministers other than Congregationalists. However, church attendance was required still, and ministers were supported from taxes.[1] "New Hampshire followed in the steps of Massachusetts, but Connecticut held out much longer against what its citizens regarded as the forces of iniquity. They allowed dissenters to escape payment of taxes to the established church if they presented the clerk of the local church with a certificate of church attendance signed by an officer of the dissenter’s own church."[2]

The constitutions of New Jersey, Georgia, North and South Carolina, Delaware, and Pennsylvania "explicitly provided that no man should be obliged to pay any church rate or attend any religious service save according to his own free and unhampered will."[3] But Virginia made the greatest effort to assure religious liberty. This might have been a reaction to the fact that Virginia had the longest establishment and one of the most rigorous. Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and George Mason were leading advocates of religious liberty, but they did not succeed in getting their ideas into law until 1786. This was done by the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom, which proclaimed religious liberty a natural right. An impressive preface states the case:

Whereas, Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burdens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hyprocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion….

The legally effective portion of the statute reads this way:

That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burdened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or beliefs; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.[4]

This was the beginning of religious liberty in America.

The movement for freeing the s***es reached a peak in the 1780′s which it would not soon attain again. Even before the break from England, the s***e trade was acquiring a bad reputation in America, but such efforts as were made to restrict it were negated by the mother country. Fiske says, "The success of the American Revolution made it possible for the different states to take measures for the gradual abolition of s***ery and the immediate abolition of the foreign s***e-trade. "[5] Nor was sentiment against s***ery restricted to states in which there were few s***es. Some of the outstanding leaders from the South during this period, most of them s***e-holders, spoke out against s***ery. Henry Laurens, a leader in South Carolina, wrote in 1776: "You know my Dear Sir. I abhor s***ery… — in former days there was no combating the prejudices of Men supported by Interest, the day I hope is approaching when from principles of gratitude as well [as] justice every Man will strive to be foremost in shewing his readiness to comply with the Golden Rule…."" Thomas Jefferson argued in his Notes on the State of Virginia that s***ery had a bad influence on the manners and morals of the white people as well as its devastating effects on the Negroes. He longed for and hoped to see the day when all s***es would be emancipated. He warned his countrymen of the impending impact on them if this were not done "And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God? That they are not to be violated but with his wrath? Indeed I tremble for my country," he said, "when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever…."[7]

Some states began to act almost as soon as the opportunity arose. In 1776, Delaware prohibited the importation of s***es and removed all restraints on their manumission. Virginia stopped s***e imports in 1778; Maryland adopted a similar measure in 1783. Both states now allowed manumission at the behest of the owner. In 1780, Pennsylvania not only prohibited further importation of s***es but also provided that after that date all children born of s***es should be free. Similar enactments were made in the early 1780′s in New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. In Massachusetts, the supreme court decided that on the basis of the constitution of 1780 s***ery was abolished in that province. Even North Carolina moved to discourage the s***e trade in 1786 by taxing heavily such s***es as were imported after that time. In order to protect free Negroes, Virginia made it a crime punishable by death for anyone found guilty of selling a freed Negro into s***ery.[8]

How far sentiment against s***ery had gone may well be best indicated by the Northwest Ordinance (1787), an act of all the states, as it were, in Congress assembled. The act provided "There shall be neither s***ery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted…." This article was passed, according to one of its proponents, without opposition.[9]

The bills of rights drawn and adopted in the various states contained provisions intended to assure individual liberties. These bills of rights were usually drawn and adopted along with constitutions but were frequently separate documents. They were usually cast in the language of natural rights theory. For example, Article I of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights states:

All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.[10]

Virginia was the first state to draw both a constitution and a bill of rights. Actually, Virginia’s Bill of Rights was adopted June 12, 1776, while the would-be state was still a colony. It was the work primarily of George Mason, was circulated among the states, and became a model for such instruments.

The Virginia Bill of Rights guaranteed trial by jury in both criminal and civil cases, prohibited excessive bail and fines, declared general warrants to be oppressive, and acknowledged freedom of the press. The protections of a person accused of a crime were spelled out:



That in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence in his favour, and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty, nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself; that no man may be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.

The only specific protection of property, other than the provision for jury trial in civil cases, was the requirement that men "cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for publick uses, without their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected…."[11]

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780, the work mainly of John Adams, was considerably more thorough. In regard to property, it said "No part of the property of any individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his consent, or that of the representative body of the people…. And whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor."[12] Other rights were alluded to than those mentioned in the Virginia Bill: freedom from unreasonable searches, the right to bear arms, the right of peaceful assembly, the prohibition of ex post facto laws, the prohibition of attainders by the legislature, as well as most of those covered in Virginia.
(Continued below)

My apologies, Don, but I can’t help but feel we’re talking in circles. How about we begin again, we can start with the points of mine that you found arbitrary, because, I thought I was being rather specific.

Your point about the course that negates the 51% total rule, is, Republicanism. I’m not sure if we’re agreeing or disagreeing ...