The "Income" tax is fraudulently applied to almost all Americans.
May 15, 2023 14:41:13 #
This is PROOF you don't have to pay taxes on your income within the United States...income from foreign sources is taxed according to the 16th amendment...Got it?...unless you're stupid...
It's from the supreme court, and it's still valid today... CATO Institute publishes the IRS version, thus letting the FRAUD continue to this day...
240 U.S. 1 (1916)
BRUSHABER v. RAILROAD COMPANY. No. 140.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued October 14, 15, 1915. Decided January 24, 1916.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. 2*2 Mr. Julien T. Davies, with whom Mr. Brainard Tolles, Mr. Garrard Glenn and Mr. Martin A. Schenck were on the brief, for the appellant.
The Solicitor General and Mr. Assistant Attorney General Wallace for the United States, as amicus curiae, by leave of the court, in support of the decree appealed from. 9*9
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.
As a stockholder of the Union Pacific Railroad Company the appellant filed his bill to enjoin the corporation from complying with the Income Tax provisions of the Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, (§ II, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166). Because of constitutional questions duly arising the case is here on direct appeal from a decree sustaining a motion to dismiss because no ground for relief was stated.
The right to prevent the corporation from returning and paying the tax was based upon many averments as to the repugnancy of the statute to the Constitution of the United States, of the peculiar relation of the corporation to the stockholders and their particular interests resulting from many of the administrative provisions of the assailed act, of the confusion, wrong and multiplicity 10*10 of suits and the absence of all means of redress which would result if the corporation paid the tax and complied with the act in other respects without protest, as it was alleged it was its intention to do. To put out of the way a question of jurisdiction we at once say that in view of these averments and the ruling in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, sustaining the right of a stockholder to sue to restrain a corporation under proper averments from voluntarily paying a tax charged to be unconstitutional on the ground that to permit such a suit did not violate the prohibitions of § 3224, Rev. Stat., against enjoining the enforcement of taxes, we are of opinion that the contention here made that there was no jurisdiction of the cause since to entertain it would violate the provisions of the Revised Statutes referred to is without merit. Before coming to dispose of the case on the merits, however, we observe that the defendant corporation having called the attention of the Government to the pendency of the cause and the nature of the controversy and its unwillingness to voluntarily refuse to comply with the act assailed, the
UNION
PACIFIC
United States as amicus curiae has at bar been heard both orally and by brief for the purpose of sustaining the decree.
Aside from averments as to citizenship and residence, recitals as to the provisions of the statute and statements as to the business of the corporation contained in the first ten paragraphs of the bill advanced to sustain jurisdiction, the bill alleged twenty-one constitutional objections specified in that number of paragraphs or subdivisions. As all the grounds assert a violation of the Constitution, it follows that in a wide sense they all charge a repugnancy of the statute to the Sixteenth Amendment under the more immediate sanction of which the statute was adopted.
The various propositions are so intermingled as to cause it to be difficult to classify them. We are of opinion, however, 11*11 that the confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the conclusion that the Sixteenth Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation, that is, a power to levy an income tax which although direct should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. And the far-reaching effect of this erroneous assumption will be made clear by generalizing the many contentions advanced in argument to support it, as follows:
(a) The Amendment authorizes only a particular character of direct tax without apportionment, and therefore if a tax is levied under its assumed authority which does not partake of the characteristics exacted by the Amendment, it is outside of the Amendment and is void as a direct tax in the general constitutional sense because not apportioned.
(b) As the Amendment authorizes a tax only upon incomes "from wh**ever source derived," the exclusion from taxation of some income of designated persons and classes is not authorized and hence the constitutionality of the law must be tested by the general provisions of the Constitution as to taxation, and thus again the tax is void for want of apportionment.
(c) As the right to tax "incomes from wh**ever source derived" for which the Amendment provides must be considered as exacting intrinsic uniformity, therefore no tax comes under the authority of the Amendment not conforming to such standard, and hence all the provisions of the assailed statute must once more be tested solely under the general and preexisting provisions of the Constitution, causing the statute again to be void in the absence of apportionment.
(d) As the power conferred by the Amendment is new and prospective, the attempt in the statute to make its provisions retroactively apply is void because so far as the retroactive period is
concerned, it is governed by the preexisting constitutional requirement as to apportionment.
But it clearly results that the proposition and the contentions 12*12 under it, if acceded to, would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned. Moreover, the tax authorized by the Amendment, being direct, would not come under the rule of uniformity applicable under the Constitution to other than direct taxes, and thus it would come to pass that the result of the Amendment would be to authorize a particular direct tax not subject either to apportionment or to the rule of geographical uniformity, thus giving power to impose a different tax in one State or States than was levied in another State or States. This result instead of simplifying the situation and making clear the limitations on the taxing power, which obviously the Amendment must have been intended to accomplish, would create radical and destructive changes in our constitutional system and multiply confusion.
But let us by a demonstration of the error of the fundamental proposition as to the significance of the Amendment dispel the confusion necessarily arising from the arguments deduced from it. Before coming, however, to the text of the Amendment, to the end that its significance may be determined in the light of the previous legislative and judicial history of the subject with which the Amendment is concerned and with a knowledge of the conditions which presumptively led up to its adoption and hence of the purpose it was intended to accomplish, we make a brief statement on those subjects the authority conferred upon Congress by § 8 of Article I "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises" is exhaustive and embraces every conceivable power of taxation has never been questioned, or, if it has, has been so often authoritatively declared as to render it necessary only to state the doctrine. And it has also never 13*13 been questioned from the foundation, without stopping presently to determine under which of the separate headings the power was properly to be classed, that there was authority given, as the part was included in the whole, to lay and collect income taxes.
Again it has never moreover been questioned that the conceded complete and all-embracing taxing power was subject, so far as they were respectively applicable, to limitations resulting from the requirements of Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, that "all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States," and to the limitations of Art. I,
§ 2, cl. 3, that "direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States" and of Art. I, § 9, cl. 4, that "no capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken."
In fact the two great subdivisions embracing the complete and perfect delegation of the power to tax and the two correlated limitations as to such power were thus aptly stated by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, supra, at page 557: "In the matter of taxation, the Constitution recognizes the two great classes of direct and indirect taxes, and lays down two rules by which their imposition must be governed, namely:
The rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of uniformity as to duties, imposts and excises." It is to be observed, however, as long ago pointed out in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 541, that the requirement of apportionment as to one of the great classes and of uniformity as to the other class were not so much a limitation upon the complete and all embracing authority to tax, but in their essence were simply regulations concerning the mode in which the plenary power was to be exerted. In the whole history of the Government down to the time of the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, leaving aside some conjectures expressed of the possibility of a tax lying intermediate between the two great classes and embraced 14*14 by neither, no question has been anywhere made as to the correctness of these propositions. At the very beginning, however, there arose differences of opinion concerning the criteria to be applied in determining in which of the two great subdivisions a tax would fall. Without pausing to state at length the basis of these differences and the consequences which arose from them, as the whole subject was elaborately reviewed in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429; 158 U.S. 601, we make a condensed statement which is in substance taken from what was said in that case.
Early the differences were manifested in pressing on the one hand and opposing on the other, the passage of an act levying a tax without apportionment on carriages "for the conveyance of persons," and when such a tax was enacted the question of its repugnancy to the Constitution soon came to this court for determination. (Hyltonv. United States, 3 Dall. 171.) It was held that the tax came within the class of excises, duties and imposts and therefore did not require apportionment, and while this conclusion was agreed to by all the members of the court who took part in the decision of the case, there was not an exact coincidence in the reasoning by which the conclusion was sustained. Without stating the minor differences, it may be said with substantial accuracy that the divergent reasoning was this:
On the one hand, that the tax was not in the class of direct taxes requiring apportionment because it was not levied directly on property because of its ownership but rather on its use and was therefore an excise, duty or impost; and on the other, that in any event the class of direct taxes included only taxes directly levied on real estate because of its ownership. Putting out of view the difference of reasoning which led to the concurrent conclusion in the Hylton Case, it is undoubted that it came to pass in legislative practice that the line of demarcation between the two great classes of direct taxes on the one hand and excises, duties and 15*15 imposts on the other which was exemplified by the ruling in that case, was accepted and acted upon. In the first place this is shown by the fact that wherever (and there were a number of cases of that kind) a tax was levied directly on real estate or s***es because of ownership, it was treated as coming within the direct class and apportionment was provided for, while no instance of apportionment as to any other kind of tax is afforded.
Again the situation is aptly illustrated by the various acts taxing incomes derived from property of every kind and nature, which were enacted beginning in 1861 and lasting during what may be termed the Civil War period. It is not disputable that these latter taxing laws were classed under the head of excises, duties and imposts because it was assumed that they were of that character inasmuch as although putting a tax burden on income of every kind, including that derived from property real or personal, they were not taxes directly on property because of its ownership. And this practical construction came in theory to be the accepted one since it was adopted without dissent by the most eminent of the text writers. 1 Kent Com. 254, 256; 1 Story Const., § 955; Cooley Const. Lim. (5th ed.) [*]480; Miller on the Constitution, 237; Pomeroy's Constitutional Law, § 281; Hare Const. Law, Vol. 1, 249, 250; Burroughs on Taxation, 502; Ordronaux, Constitutional Legislation, 225.
Upon the lapsing of a considerable period after the repeal of the income tax laws referred to, in 1894 an act was passed laying a tax on incomes from all classes of property and other sources of revenue, which was not apportioned, and which therefore was of course assumed to come within the classification of excises, duties and imposts, which were subject to the rule of uniformity but not to the rule of apportionment. The constitutional validity of this law was challenged on the ground that it did not fall within the class of excises, duties and imposts, 16*16 but was direct in the constitutional sense and was therefore void for want of apportionment, and that question came to this court and was passed upon in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429; 158 U.S. 601. The court, fully recognizing
in the passage which we have previously quoted the all-embracing character of the two great classifications including, on the one hand, direct taxes subject to apportionment, and on the other, excises, duties and imposts subject to uniformity, held the law to be unconstitutional in substance for these reasons: Concluding that the classification of direct was adopted for the purpose of rendering it impossible to burden by taxation accumulations of property, real or personal, except subject to the regulation of apportionment, it was held that the duty existed to fix what was a direct tax in the constitutional sense so as to accomplish this purpose contemplated by the Constitution. (157 U.S. 581.)
It's from the supreme court, and it's still valid today... CATO Institute publishes the IRS version, thus letting the FRAUD continue to this day...
240 U.S. 1 (1916)
BRUSHABER v. RAILROAD COMPANY. No. 140.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued October 14, 15, 1915. Decided January 24, 1916.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. 2*2 Mr. Julien T. Davies, with whom Mr. Brainard Tolles, Mr. Garrard Glenn and Mr. Martin A. Schenck were on the brief, for the appellant.
The Solicitor General and Mr. Assistant Attorney General Wallace for the United States, as amicus curiae, by leave of the court, in support of the decree appealed from. 9*9
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.
As a stockholder of the Union Pacific Railroad Company the appellant filed his bill to enjoin the corporation from complying with the Income Tax provisions of the Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, (§ II, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166). Because of constitutional questions duly arising the case is here on direct appeal from a decree sustaining a motion to dismiss because no ground for relief was stated.
The right to prevent the corporation from returning and paying the tax was based upon many averments as to the repugnancy of the statute to the Constitution of the United States, of the peculiar relation of the corporation to the stockholders and their particular interests resulting from many of the administrative provisions of the assailed act, of the confusion, wrong and multiplicity 10*10 of suits and the absence of all means of redress which would result if the corporation paid the tax and complied with the act in other respects without protest, as it was alleged it was its intention to do. To put out of the way a question of jurisdiction we at once say that in view of these averments and the ruling in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, sustaining the right of a stockholder to sue to restrain a corporation under proper averments from voluntarily paying a tax charged to be unconstitutional on the ground that to permit such a suit did not violate the prohibitions of § 3224, Rev. Stat., against enjoining the enforcement of taxes, we are of opinion that the contention here made that there was no jurisdiction of the cause since to entertain it would violate the provisions of the Revised Statutes referred to is without merit. Before coming to dispose of the case on the merits, however, we observe that the defendant corporation having called the attention of the Government to the pendency of the cause and the nature of the controversy and its unwillingness to voluntarily refuse to comply with the act assailed, the
UNION
PACIFIC
United States as amicus curiae has at bar been heard both orally and by brief for the purpose of sustaining the decree.
Aside from averments as to citizenship and residence, recitals as to the provisions of the statute and statements as to the business of the corporation contained in the first ten paragraphs of the bill advanced to sustain jurisdiction, the bill alleged twenty-one constitutional objections specified in that number of paragraphs or subdivisions. As all the grounds assert a violation of the Constitution, it follows that in a wide sense they all charge a repugnancy of the statute to the Sixteenth Amendment under the more immediate sanction of which the statute was adopted.
The various propositions are so intermingled as to cause it to be difficult to classify them. We are of opinion, however, 11*11 that the confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the conclusion that the Sixteenth Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation, that is, a power to levy an income tax which although direct should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. And the far-reaching effect of this erroneous assumption will be made clear by generalizing the many contentions advanced in argument to support it, as follows:
(a) The Amendment authorizes only a particular character of direct tax without apportionment, and therefore if a tax is levied under its assumed authority which does not partake of the characteristics exacted by the Amendment, it is outside of the Amendment and is void as a direct tax in the general constitutional sense because not apportioned.
(b) As the Amendment authorizes a tax only upon incomes "from wh**ever source derived," the exclusion from taxation of some income of designated persons and classes is not authorized and hence the constitutionality of the law must be tested by the general provisions of the Constitution as to taxation, and thus again the tax is void for want of apportionment.
(c) As the right to tax "incomes from wh**ever source derived" for which the Amendment provides must be considered as exacting intrinsic uniformity, therefore no tax comes under the authority of the Amendment not conforming to such standard, and hence all the provisions of the assailed statute must once more be tested solely under the general and preexisting provisions of the Constitution, causing the statute again to be void in the absence of apportionment.
(d) As the power conferred by the Amendment is new and prospective, the attempt in the statute to make its provisions retroactively apply is void because so far as the retroactive period is
concerned, it is governed by the preexisting constitutional requirement as to apportionment.
But it clearly results that the proposition and the contentions 12*12 under it, if acceded to, would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned. Moreover, the tax authorized by the Amendment, being direct, would not come under the rule of uniformity applicable under the Constitution to other than direct taxes, and thus it would come to pass that the result of the Amendment would be to authorize a particular direct tax not subject either to apportionment or to the rule of geographical uniformity, thus giving power to impose a different tax in one State or States than was levied in another State or States. This result instead of simplifying the situation and making clear the limitations on the taxing power, which obviously the Amendment must have been intended to accomplish, would create radical and destructive changes in our constitutional system and multiply confusion.
But let us by a demonstration of the error of the fundamental proposition as to the significance of the Amendment dispel the confusion necessarily arising from the arguments deduced from it. Before coming, however, to the text of the Amendment, to the end that its significance may be determined in the light of the previous legislative and judicial history of the subject with which the Amendment is concerned and with a knowledge of the conditions which presumptively led up to its adoption and hence of the purpose it was intended to accomplish, we make a brief statement on those subjects the authority conferred upon Congress by § 8 of Article I "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises" is exhaustive and embraces every conceivable power of taxation has never been questioned, or, if it has, has been so often authoritatively declared as to render it necessary only to state the doctrine. And it has also never 13*13 been questioned from the foundation, without stopping presently to determine under which of the separate headings the power was properly to be classed, that there was authority given, as the part was included in the whole, to lay and collect income taxes.
Again it has never moreover been questioned that the conceded complete and all-embracing taxing power was subject, so far as they were respectively applicable, to limitations resulting from the requirements of Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, that "all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States," and to the limitations of Art. I,
§ 2, cl. 3, that "direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States" and of Art. I, § 9, cl. 4, that "no capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken."
In fact the two great subdivisions embracing the complete and perfect delegation of the power to tax and the two correlated limitations as to such power were thus aptly stated by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, supra, at page 557: "In the matter of taxation, the Constitution recognizes the two great classes of direct and indirect taxes, and lays down two rules by which their imposition must be governed, namely:
The rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of uniformity as to duties, imposts and excises." It is to be observed, however, as long ago pointed out in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 541, that the requirement of apportionment as to one of the great classes and of uniformity as to the other class were not so much a limitation upon the complete and all embracing authority to tax, but in their essence were simply regulations concerning the mode in which the plenary power was to be exerted. In the whole history of the Government down to the time of the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, leaving aside some conjectures expressed of the possibility of a tax lying intermediate between the two great classes and embraced 14*14 by neither, no question has been anywhere made as to the correctness of these propositions. At the very beginning, however, there arose differences of opinion concerning the criteria to be applied in determining in which of the two great subdivisions a tax would fall. Without pausing to state at length the basis of these differences and the consequences which arose from them, as the whole subject was elaborately reviewed in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429; 158 U.S. 601, we make a condensed statement which is in substance taken from what was said in that case.
Early the differences were manifested in pressing on the one hand and opposing on the other, the passage of an act levying a tax without apportionment on carriages "for the conveyance of persons," and when such a tax was enacted the question of its repugnancy to the Constitution soon came to this court for determination. (Hyltonv. United States, 3 Dall. 171.) It was held that the tax came within the class of excises, duties and imposts and therefore did not require apportionment, and while this conclusion was agreed to by all the members of the court who took part in the decision of the case, there was not an exact coincidence in the reasoning by which the conclusion was sustained. Without stating the minor differences, it may be said with substantial accuracy that the divergent reasoning was this:
On the one hand, that the tax was not in the class of direct taxes requiring apportionment because it was not levied directly on property because of its ownership but rather on its use and was therefore an excise, duty or impost; and on the other, that in any event the class of direct taxes included only taxes directly levied on real estate because of its ownership. Putting out of view the difference of reasoning which led to the concurrent conclusion in the Hylton Case, it is undoubted that it came to pass in legislative practice that the line of demarcation between the two great classes of direct taxes on the one hand and excises, duties and 15*15 imposts on the other which was exemplified by the ruling in that case, was accepted and acted upon. In the first place this is shown by the fact that wherever (and there were a number of cases of that kind) a tax was levied directly on real estate or s***es because of ownership, it was treated as coming within the direct class and apportionment was provided for, while no instance of apportionment as to any other kind of tax is afforded.
Again the situation is aptly illustrated by the various acts taxing incomes derived from property of every kind and nature, which were enacted beginning in 1861 and lasting during what may be termed the Civil War period. It is not disputable that these latter taxing laws were classed under the head of excises, duties and imposts because it was assumed that they were of that character inasmuch as although putting a tax burden on income of every kind, including that derived from property real or personal, they were not taxes directly on property because of its ownership. And this practical construction came in theory to be the accepted one since it was adopted without dissent by the most eminent of the text writers. 1 Kent Com. 254, 256; 1 Story Const., § 955; Cooley Const. Lim. (5th ed.) [*]480; Miller on the Constitution, 237; Pomeroy's Constitutional Law, § 281; Hare Const. Law, Vol. 1, 249, 250; Burroughs on Taxation, 502; Ordronaux, Constitutional Legislation, 225.
Upon the lapsing of a considerable period after the repeal of the income tax laws referred to, in 1894 an act was passed laying a tax on incomes from all classes of property and other sources of revenue, which was not apportioned, and which therefore was of course assumed to come within the classification of excises, duties and imposts, which were subject to the rule of uniformity but not to the rule of apportionment. The constitutional validity of this law was challenged on the ground that it did not fall within the class of excises, duties and imposts, 16*16 but was direct in the constitutional sense and was therefore void for want of apportionment, and that question came to this court and was passed upon in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429; 158 U.S. 601. The court, fully recognizing
in the passage which we have previously quoted the all-embracing character of the two great classifications including, on the one hand, direct taxes subject to apportionment, and on the other, excises, duties and imposts subject to uniformity, held the law to be unconstitutional in substance for these reasons: Concluding that the classification of direct was adopted for the purpose of rendering it impossible to burden by taxation accumulations of property, real or personal, except subject to the regulation of apportionment, it was held that the duty existed to fix what was a direct tax in the constitutional sense so as to accomplish this purpose contemplated by the Constitution. (157 U.S. 581.)
May 15, 2023 14:43:24 #
May 15, 2023 16:00:36 #
Hopefully they’ll amend the whole Tax statue soon and will just go to a flat income tax, or illuminate the income tax completely, and go with something that’s much more fair and equitable to everybody, which would be a national sales tax
May 16, 2023 11:41:32 #
How many here realize the IRS is not a part of the Federel government?
It is the collection agency for the Banking Cabal, identified as the Fereeral Reserve System.
We are being used as indentured servants to pay a debt to a private corporation.
Article 1, Section 10 of the US Constitution designates the power to create "money" to the House of Representatives.
There are many reasons for that.
One being; if they screw up they can be v**ed out every 2 years.
Senators are in for 6 years.
Presidents for 4 years.
If I recall correctly; Fed Reserve board members are elected for 14 years.
It is the collection agency for the Banking Cabal, identified as the Fereeral Reserve System.
We are being used as indentured servants to pay a debt to a private corporation.
Article 1, Section 10 of the US Constitution designates the power to create "money" to the House of Representatives.
There are many reasons for that.
One being; if they screw up they can be v**ed out every 2 years.
Senators are in for 6 years.
Presidents for 4 years.
If I recall correctly; Fed Reserve board members are elected for 14 years.
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