12/07/2018 Secularization: Thoughts on its Many Historical Causes (Part 2)
Secularization (or secularisation) is the transformation of a society from close identification.
And affiliation with religious values and institutions toward nonreligious values and secular institutions. ...
Secularization refers to the historical process in which religion loses social and cultural significance
Dave Armstrong
https://www.patheos.com/blogs/davearmstrong/2018/12/secularization-thoughts-on-its-many-historical-causes.html? https://www.patheos.com/blogs/davearmstrong/author/davearmstrong The wars in turn led to the cultural exhaustion and malaise described by Dawson. In that sense of a causal chain one might argue that Protestantism caused the drive towards secularization that has never ceased to increase from that day to this.
But as I say, this is only one aspect among many, and neither it nor Berger’s analysis should be construed as the be-all and end-all of historical discussion concerning secularization.
That’s far too simplistic, in my opinion.
I would also point out, in fairness (to give much credit to Protestantism in this respect) that the history of revivalism within the Protestant tradition has been a great cultural force against secularization.
This can be seen especially in the Wesleyan and Whitefield revivals in 17th-century England, which had vast positive social consequences, and the First and Second Great Awakenings in America:
Arguably responsible for slowing down the subsequent slide into a thorough quasi-humanist secularism for a good century.
(For early America was greatly influenced by the Enlightenment, deism, and a liberal brand of disillusioned post-Calvinist, post-Puritan Christianity).
Along these lines, I would cite and recommend books such as Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform. by William G. McLoughlin (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978), and Revivalism and Social Reform, by Timothy L. Smith (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957).
The latter begins with this delightful passage:
Could Thomas Paine, the free-thinking pamphleteer of the American and French revolutions, have visited Broadway in 1865, he would have been amazed to find that the nation conceived in rational liberty was at last fulfilling its democratic promise in the power of evangelical faith.
The emancipating glory of the great awakenings had made Christian liberty, Christian equality and Christian fraternity the passion of the land . . .
Religious doctrines which Paine, in his book The Age of Reason, had discarded as the tattered vestment of an outworn aristocracy, became the wedding garb of a democratized church, bent on preparing men and institutions for a kind of proletarian marriage supper of the Lamb.
(Preface, p. 7)
These movements were not without their own faults, and arguably contained the seeds of an eventual further descent into secularism and sectarianism.
But that is beyond my immediate point, which is simply that Protestant revivalism has been a considerably powerful force against secularism and irreligion, and towards a Christian worldview with culturally transformative power and import.
It would be just as wrong for a Protestant with a sophisticated view of history, sociology, and culture to deny the positive aspects of revivalism, as it would be for a Catholic to do so.
What’s true (and documented from history) is true.
I would argue (if I must make a general statement) that it is not Protestantism per se which caused secularization, but rather, that some aspects of Protestantism tied in with some aspects of existing forces destructive of the unified medieval and Catholic synthesis and worldview
(Nominalism, the Renaissance, nationalism, the Divine Right of Kings, unbridled capitalism, the so-called “Enlightenment,” the philosophers Locke, Kant, Hume, etc.).
Catholicism-in-practice also contributed to this demise insofar as it was nominal and morally-compromised.
After all, the rise of Protestantism was not hindered by Italian and Roman decadence, and the “Enlightenment” and the hideous French Revolution took place in Catholic France.
In any event, the medieval synthesis and Christian culture was Catholic through and through, and Protestantism obviously helped to bring that to an end (thus playing a “decisive” role, as Berger argues)
But it alone was not the primary factor (though I regard it as a major one), and it often worked as a counter-force to secularization, as argued in the above examples.
Whatever the cause, we are in a mess today, because people do not think “Christianly.”
One of the most extraordinary and remarkably insightful books I have ever read was The Gravedigger Files, by Os Guinness (Downers Grove, Illinois: Inter-Varsity Press, 1983).
The subtitle is “Papers on the Subversion of the Modern Church.”
It is a masterpiece of Christian sociology, written in the style of.
C. S. Lewis’s Screwtape Letters.
I shall cite just one passage, where Guinness is dealing with what he calls “The Private-Zoo Factor” (privatization of religion):
If the ultimate value is survival and the immediate value is personal peace and prosperity, then those brought up to live for themselves will be less inclined to live (or die) for others . . .
The privatized person is . . . a “classic narcissist,” client to the multiplying therapeutic agencies in a world in which, as Orwell said, “Freud and Machiavelli have reached the outer suburbs”; . . .
The extremes here do not have to be coaxed into a cage; they virtually sit mewing for one.
Notice again how the contradiction between the ostensible freedom and the true situation is entirely to our advantage [these are demonsspeaking, remember].
Once more privatized freedom is not the freedom it seems . . .
In the past we have cultivated religious individualism and have found that certain strains of faith such as pietism are particularly fruitful for our purposes.
But never have we had such harvest as this.
You know that the Greeks defined the idiot as a wholly private person.
Privatization multiplies the number of Christians who fall prey to this and makes such idiocy a spiritual condition.
I would not deny that there are exceptions to all this.
There are theological traditions (such as the reformed) which refuse to fall for narrow pietism . . .
Or recent movements which have made a noise about faith in public (though mostly about more personal things, such as abortion and pornography).
But these, fortunately, are exceptions.
(pp. 85-86)
Many evangelical spokesmen have become alarmed at the sorts of trends that Os Guinness decried above.
David Wells, professor of Theology at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary in South Hamilton, Massachusetts, wrote:
We . . . are reducing historical Protestant faith to a mass of diverse, conflicting ‘models.’
I cannot see it all surviving.
That a sundering of the movement is coming seems utterly certain to me; the only question is when, how, and with what consequences.
(“Evangelical Megashift”, Christianity Today, February 19, 1990, 15 ff. )
Jon Johnston, professor of Urban Ministry and Sociology of Religion at Fuller Theological Seminary in California, and a Church of the Nazarene minister, wrote cogently in a work on this very subject, back in 1980:
Evangelicals . . . are increasingly opting for godless cultural values. Our degree of compromise has reached epidemlc proportions . . .
Popularity can prompt disastrous compromise.
I firmly believe that compromise, or ‘accommodation,’ is the most formidable threat to evangelicalism today’ . . .
Evangelicalism is in serious danger of . . . becoming engulfed by the surrounding culture.
(Will Evangelicalism Survive Its Own Popularity?, preface, 35, 39)
Lastly, I would cite James Davison Hunter, professor of Sociology at the University of Virginia, and one of the leading authorities on evangelicalism today;
The author of American Evangelicalism (1983) and Evangelicalism: The Coming Generation (1987).
Another article in Christianity Today described an address of his on this general theme:
Hunter identified the major combatants in the cultural war.
a. Traditional Orthodoxy, he said, holds a transcendent view of moral authority, as expressed in Scripture, the Roman Catholic magisterium, the Torah.
What Hunter called a ‘progressive’ view of authority, based on Enlightenment thinking, is grounded in human, rational discourse.
Hunter contended that advocates of the new way of thinking are winning the war.
While allowing that ‘evangelicalism is the most vibrant form of religious expression,’ he said there is no evidence to support the oft-stated assertion that the evangelical faith is in the midst of revival . . .
Hunter . . . added, ‘There is a very strong undercurrent of subjectivizing the gospel and the theological task.’
(Randy Frame, “Theological Drift: Christian Higher Ed the Culprit?,”Christianity Today, April 9, 1990; citation from pp. 43, 46)
Catholics are, of course, subject to the same cultural influences and are increasingly Americanized, privatized, and rendered ignorant from abominable catechesis and the liberal crisis in our own Church.
To the extent that Catholics suffer that fate, they, too, do not think Christianly and contribute to the continuing secularization and decadence of our society and culture.
So (to end on an ecumenical note),
I would echo C. S. Lewis’s comment that those at the center of their own theological traditions are all closer to one another in spirit than those on the outer edges (liberals, modernists, nominalists, semi-non-Christian syncretists, etc.).
This is a fight of serious, committed Christians of all stripes against the postmodernist, humanist culture of death and all that it entails.
That is one reason (of many) why I absolutely despise both anti-Catholicism and anti-Protestantism, because they zap the energy and influence that the already weak Christian community has (itself the last hope against the encroaching darkness), by dividing Christians and setting them against each other.
Nero fiddled while Rome burned.
We Christians mock and battle and lie about and misrepresent each other on the Internet while western civilization goes to hell in a handbasket.
It is wicked, and it is the devil’s victory.
(End Part 2)