Canuckus Deploracus wrote:
It requires a VPN... Must be tasty
I'll look at it when I get on the computer
It was tasty, long, and very informative! The more I research, the more I realize the similarities between Russia and China and their use of propaganda.
This is the last part of the article…………The picture that it paints is very different than the one that you have painted. IMO!
Some see Putin’s invasion of Ukraine as a gambit aimed at boosting his popularity, a bid to rekindle the nationalist exhilaration that followed the annexation of Crimea. That explanation seems unlikely. If domestic support were the goal, Putin would have settled for recognizing—and perhaps annexing—the two self-declared Donbas republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, which might have been a reasonably popular move. But polls conducted before the invasion suggested no enthusiasm for a broader war. And had Putin believed that a full-scale invasion would boost his ratings, he would hardly have pretended for so long that Russian “peacekeepers” were intervening surgically only to stop a genocide in the Donbas. More likely, Putin’s sense of having effectively repressed domestic opposition is what liberated him to indulge in more grandiose international projects.
Putin’s task of political survival just got a lot harder.
Politics in Russia will now take place in the shadow of the war in Ukraine. Wars often rally citizens behind their leader at first. But they also destabilize domestic affairs, shifting opinion and power in unpredictable ways. Polls conducted by Kremlin-connected firms early in the war suggested that many Russians accepted the official narrative that NATO threats or Ukrainian atrocities forced Putin’s hand, although obviously polls taken in a harsh dictatorship by pollsters with government ties—in wartime, no less—should be treated with skepticism. Russian public opinion may well change as information filters through. Russians will learn that their troops have killed thousands of Ukrainians—not just in the east, in order to stop a purported genocide, but all over the country—and they will hear of Russian casualties. After years of living under mild sanctions, they now face wrenching economic disruptions. They will see their leader, who came to power promising stability—and for a long time seemed to provide it—transformed into an architect of instability. Those convinced that the threat from NATO had to be addressed will see the alliance reinvigorated and deploying more weapons along Russia’s western border. The new global isolation—with Russia’s sports teams and performers boycotted—will prove demoralizing. Even those ultranationalists who favored Putin’s war will probably be disappointed by the inevitably messy, bloody, and inconclusive aftermath.
Lacking resources and other tools, Putin will be tempted to ratchet up intimidation even more. But in economically developed, complex societies, where the public has access to communications technology and discontent is widespread, increased repression can backfire, sparking greater resistance. Putin is even more vulnerable because of the highly personal responsibility he took for the invasion, justifying it with a historical essay on the relationship between Russians and Ukrainians published in the summer of 2021 and with an impassioned speech delivered three days before the invasion began. A few hours before that speech was broadcast on state TV, he held a videotaped meeting with his Security Council, possibly to spread accountability to all its members, who obediently expressed support for his decision to recognize the two breakaway republics. But the heavy-handed choreography, with Putin sitting alone at a long table and questioning each member, in fact sent a message of dictatorial direction.
At the same time, as he moves to ever more repression, Putin will become more beholden to the siloviki. To retain control over the various agencies and factions of the Russian security state, he will have to continue balancing and pitting them against one another. He will need to move powerful individuals around, skillfully identifying any hints of disloyalty. Purges of the elite, which had already been on the rise, will become even more pronounced.
By attacking the postwar international order and changing his strategy of control at home, Putin has gambled with his own future. Initiating a war that does not go according to plan is a classic mistake that has undermined many authoritarian regimes in the past. The brazenness of Putin’s lie—sending forces to attack Kyiv while claiming that they were rescuing genocide victims in the Donbas—could also blow up in his face. The contradiction between his declared goal of uniting Slavic peoples and his method—bombing residential neighborhoods—may be too much for even a skilled propaganda machine to reconcile. Many Russians may instinctively seek to avoid cognitive dissonance by rallying behind their leader. But when that dissonance is too great, the result can be a paradigm shift. With a bureaucracy of repression as well equipped and practiced as that in Russia, Putin may feel reasonably secure, but his task of political survival just got a lot harder.