Airforceone wrote:
Right now the Israelis have over 8,300 Hamas prisoners so I think 3 to 1 is not bad. But people like you just can’t get to the facts as to what Biden has negotiated.
Hypothetically, imagine for a moment you are a sheriff and you have 3 young Arabs locked in your jail who were trained from childhood to kill you because of your race or religion.
These killers will resort to any means to kill you, like cut off your head, or soak you in gasoline and burn you to death, or hang you, cut you to pieces with a machine gun, or crucify you, or even strap on an explosive vest and turn you and themselves into Hadji Hamburger.
One day a "negotiator" shows up with a proposal. He will release a 70 year old woman hostage for the three terrorists. And you agree.
The "negotiator" releases the old woman and true to your word, you release the three terrorists.
Keep in mind, the "negotiator" is merely a trade broker, he has no responsibility whatsoever in determining the future of the old woman or the terrorists.
The old woman is reunited with her family, she is safe now, or is she?
The three terrorists are reunited with their Hamas commander who rearms them with AKs, RPGs, and grenades,
and sends them back to work killing your people - "Allahu ackbar!"
You think you saved one person's life, but did you?
How many of your people will the three terrorists kill before they are once again captured or killed?
Airforceone wrote:
Right now the Israelis have over 8,300 Hamas prisoners so I think 3 to 1 is not bad.
Think so, huh?
Abstract
A key objection raised by terrorism scholars and policymakers against engaging in negotiations with terrorists is that it legitimizes terrorist groups, their goals and their means. Talking to them would serve only to incite more violence and weaken the fabric of democratic states, they argue. With the emergence of Al-Qaeda and its complex transnational structure, many have added another objection: Who does one talk to? Faced with such a multifaceted, horizontal organization, how does one engage? This article offers an alternative approach to the question of legitimacy and complexity in engaging with terrorism. Drawing from research in peace and conflict studies, it analyses how these two factors may in fact be conducive to a nonviolent resolution of conflicts involving terrorist violence. Using the conflicts in Northern Ireland and the southern Philippine region of Mindanao as illustrations, the article argues that the legitimation of 'terrorist' groups through talks can be a means to transform a conflict away from violence, while complexity may in fact open up new possibilities for engagement. The article concludes by examining how the naming of a group as 'terrorist' can and is often designed to forestall nonviolent responses to terrorism.