Nickolai wrote:
De regulation gave us the S&L collapse
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 removed many restrictions on thrifts and credit unions; the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 gave thrifts greater latitude to invest in real estate loans; and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 fundamentally altered the banking landscape in many ways. Essentially, the (local) S&L's were 'allowed' to compete in the marketplace for real estate business against the (national) big banks on a level playing field for the first time, and the Wall Street bankers were losing business to these smaller and more local institutions at an alarming rate.
Here's the 'official' narrative:
Severe economic downturns in the early 1980s and early 1990s, and the collapse in real estate and energy prices during this period were key precipitating factors in an increasingly unstable financial environment prevalent throughout these years. Fraud (primarily looting or control fraud) and other types of insider misconduct played a major role in the overall crisis as well. If anything, government regulation
contributed to the crisis. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 fundamentally altered the banking landscape and engendered conditions that directly exacerbated to the banking crisis.
Nickolai wrote:
[T]he World Com, and Enron scandals
WorldCom first:
In June, 2002, the telecommunications company reported that it had fired Chief Financial Officer Scott Sullivan, and accepted the resignation of senior vice president and controller David Myers, after an internal audit found
improper accounting of more than $3.8 billion in expenses over five quarters. That's nearly $800 million per quarter, or over $250 million a month. That is fraud on a colossal scale, the like of which had never been seen before.
"This is why the market keeps going down every day - investors don't know who to trust," said Brett Trueman, an accounting professor from the University of California-Berkeley's Haas School of Business, in an interview with CBS MarketWatch. "As these things come out, it just continues to build up." When you don't know who you can trust, by default, you don't trust anyone. As for Worldcom, the company's shares, among the most heavily traded on Wall Street in the few months leading up to June, 2002, fell as much as 76 percent in after-hours action following the announcement and at one point were trading at 20 cents each. In the previous January, they were trading at about $15.
WorldCom restated its financial results for all of 2001 and the first quarter of 2002 taking almost $3.8 billion in cash flow off its books, wiping out all profit during those times. The misstated billions were also very bad news for ordinary WorldCom workers: 17,000 of them were either fired outright or laid off.
The company said the accounting irregularities,
which did not conform to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, included transfers between internal accounts of $3.06 billion in 2001 and $797 million in the first quarter of 2002. Deregulation, you say?
Now on to Enron:
An ENRON Scandal Summary of the acts of Embezzlement undertaken by ENRON Executives may be defined as the
criminal activity involving the unlawful and unethical attainment of monies and funding by employees; typically, funds that are embezzled are intended for company use in lieu of personal use. While the ENRON executives were
pocketing the investment funds from unsuspecting investors, those funds were being
stolen from the company, which resulted in the bankruptcy of the company.
Due to the actions of the ENRON executives, the ENRON Company went bankrupt. The loss sustained by investors exceeded $70 billion. Furthermore, these actions cost both trustees and employees upwards of $2 billion; this total is considered to be a result of misappropriated investments, pension funds, stock options, and savings plans –
as a result of the government regulation and the limited liability status of the ENRON Corporation, only a small amount of the money lost was ever returned.
Nickolai wrote:
The Electrical utilities bankruptcies and rolling black outs
Now this is one instance when the incompetence of government in all things economic really shines out.
Dateline: April 7, 2001.
The Pacific Gas and Electric Company, California's largest investor-owned utility, filed for bankruptcy protection today, declaring that
politicians and regulators had not moved quickly enough to resolve an energy crisis that has caused periodic rolling blackouts and is costing the state billions of dollars.
Legislators and regulators had been loath to bail out Pacific Gas and Electric or the No. 2 utility, Southern California Edison, whose billions in debt to wholesalers and marketers stem from
flawed state deregulation that
did not allow the utilities to pass on rising costs to consumers.
Negative cash flow directly caused by government removal of regulation on one aspect of the utility business but not on another interrelated aspect. Essentially, restrictions on wholesale electricity were lifted to encourage Texas generating companies to 'export' electricity to Southern California where demand far outstripped supply capabilities. Prices for this service immediately skyrocketed, leaving Pacific Gas and Electric, and Southern California Edison with significantly higher overhead. This situation was unresolvable because of regulatory prohibitions on raising prices. When the utilities petitioned the California government to allow them to raise prices to compensate for this loss, they were effectively told to pound sand. hence bankruptcies and rolling blackouts.
Nickolai wrote:
[T]he Dot Com bust
For many, this was their first exposure to the concept of a 'stock market bubble'. Essentially, a 'bubble' describes what happens when basic investing fundamentals are ignored in the rush to 'cash in' on a given market mania. The profits are impressive and real; unfortunately, the losses are even more impressive and just as real when the bubble 'bursts'.
Although high-tech standard bearers, such as Intel, Cisco, and Oracle were driving the organic growth in the technology sector, it was the upstart dotcom companies that fueled the stock market surge that began in 1995.
The dotcom bubble was the result of a combination of the presence of speculative or fad-based investing, the abundance of venture capital funding for startups and the failure of the 'dotcoms' to turn a profit. Investors poured money into Internet startups during the 1990s in the hope that those companies would one day become profitable, and many investors and venture capitalists abandoned a cautious approach for fear of not being able to cash in on the growing use of the Internet. Essentially, they did not care that a 'dotcom' startup had a P/E ratio of infinity, speculation ruled the day. Companies that had yet to generate revenue or profits or, in some cases, even a finished product, went to market with initial public offerings that saw their stock prices triple and quadruple in a single day, creating a feeding frenzy for investors.
The NASDAQ index peaked on March 10, 2000, at 5048, nearly double over the prior year. Right at the market’s peak, several of the leading high-tech companies, such as Dell and Cisco placed huge sell orders on their stocks, sparking panic selling among investors. Within a few weeks, the stock market lost 10% of its value. As investment capital began to dry up, so did the life blood of cash-strapped dotcom companies. Dotcom companies that had reached market capitalization in the hundreds of millions of dollars became worthless within a matter of months. By the end of 2001, a majority of publicly traded dotcom companies folded, and trillions of dollars of investment capital evaporated. Oops. Regulators didn't see that one coming!
Nickolai wrote:
[A]nd the 2007-8-9 financial collapse and the too big to jail wall street banksters
'Too big to jail'. I like that. It's a good play on words and it is absolutely true. They should have been jailed. For fraudulently misleading investors about the quality of their derivative products.
The years before the crisis saw a flood of irresponsible mortgage lending in America. Loans were doled out to “subprime” borrowers with poor credit histories who struggled to repay them. These were dubbed 'subprime' loans. The 'subprime' part was due to the fact that the initial interest rate was significantly below the prime rate, making it temporarily affordable to riskier borrowers.
These risky mortgages were passed on to financial engineers at the big banks, who turned them into supposedly low-risk securities by putting large numbers of them together in pools. Pooling works when the risks of each loan are uncorrelated. This worked well, for the banks. Investors bought the safer investments because they trusted the triple-A credit ratings assigned by agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. This was another mistake. The agencies were paid by, and so beholden to, the banks that created the CDOs. Once these 'subprime' mortgages began resetting and reverting to market rates of interest, many borrowers saw their payments double overnight and were unable to service this amount of debt. Starting in 2006, America suffered a nationwide house-price slump. This was a disaster, for the securities investors holding all these subprime loan agreements.
Trust, the ultimate glue of all financial systems, began to dissolve in 2007—a year before Lehman’s bankruptcy—as banks started questioning the viability of their counter-parties. AIG buckled within days of the Lehman bankruptcy under the weight of the expansive credit-risk protection it had sold. The whole system was revealed to have been built on flimsy foundations: banks had allowed their balance-sheets to bloat, but set aside too little capital to absorb losses. In effect they had bet on themselves with borrowed money, a gamble that had paid off in good times but proved totally catastrophic in bad.
Suddenly, nobody trusted anybody, so nobody would lend. Non-financial companies, unable to rely on being able to borrow to pay suppliers or workers, froze spending in order to hoard cash,
causing a seizure in the real economy. Ironically, the decision to stand back and allow Lehman to go bankrupt resulted in
more government intervention, not less.
Regulators and bankers ignored existing regulations, exasperating the bust when it inevitably came. When economies are doing well there are
powerful political pressures not to rock the boat. With inflation at bay central bankers could not appeal to their usual rationale for spoiling the party. The long period of economic and price stability over which they presided encouraged risk-taking. And as so often in the history of financial crashes, humble consumers also joined in the collective
delusion that lasting prosperity could be built on ever-bigger piles of debt.
And there we have it. I think it is blatantly obvious that government intervention in economic matters is never going to improve the situation, but will act to make things worse, sometimes much, much worse.